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Abstract
The aim of this paper is to investigate how the capacity of an economic system to
absorb shocks depends on the specific pattern of interconnections established among
financial firms. The key trade-off at work is between the risk-sharing gains enjoyed by
firms when they become more interconnected and the large-scale costs resulting from an
increased risk exposure. We focus on two dimensions of the network structure: the size of
the (disjoint) components into which the network is divided, and the “relative density”
of connections within each component. We find that when the distribution of the shocks
displays ”fat” tails extreme segmentation is optimal, while minimal segmentation and
high density are optimal when the distribution exhibits ”thin” tails. For other, less
regular distributions intermediate degrees of segmentation and sparser connections are
also optimal. We also find that there is typically a conflict between efficiency and
pairwise stability, due to a “size externality” that is not internalized by firms who
belong to components that have reached an individually optimal size. Finally, optimality
requires perfect assortativity for firms in a component.
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1 Introduction
Recent economic events have made it clear that looking at financial entities in isolation, ab-
stracting from their linkages, gives an incomplete, and possibly very misleading, impression
of the potential impact of shocks to the financial system. In the words of Acharya et al.
(2010) “current financial regulations, such as Basel I and Basel II, are designed to limit each
institution’s risk seen in isolation; they are not sufficiently focused on systemic risk even
though systemic risk is often the rationale provided for such regulation.” The aim of this
paper is precisely to investigate how the capacity of the system to absorb shocks depends
on the pattern of interconnections established among financial firms, say banks.
More specifically, we intend to study the extent to which the risk-sharing benefits to firms
of becoming more highly interconnected (which provides some insurance against relatively
small shocks, absorbable within the whole system) may be offset by the large-scale costs
resulting from an increased risk exposure (which, for large shocks, could entail a large wave
of induced bankruptcies). That is, we want to analyze the trade-off between risk-sharing
and contagion. Clearly, this trade-off must be at the center of any regulatory efforts of
the financial world that takes a truly systemic view of the problem. This paper highlights
some of the considerations that should play a key role in this endeavor. In particular, by
formulating the problem in a stylized and analytically tractable framework, it examines how
the segmentation of the system into separate components, the density of the connections
within each component as well as asymmetries in the pattern of connections should be
tailored to the underlying shock structure. It also sheds light on the key issue of whether the
normative prescriptions on the optimal pattern of linkages are consistent with the individual
incentives to form or remove links.
We analyze a model in which there is a network consisting of N nodes, each of them
interpreted as a firm. For simplicity, in most of the paper we shall consider the case where
all firms are ex ante identical and are endowed with the same level of assets and liabilities.
But ex post they will be different since we assume that, with some probability, a shock hits
a randomly selected firm. The first direct effect of such a shock is to decrease the income
generated by the firm’s assets, thus possibly leading to the default of the firm if its resulting
income falls short of its liabilities. But if this firm has links to other firms, the latter will
also be affected. To be specific, let us think of the presence of a link between two firms as
reflecting an exchange of the assets they are endowed with. Then, the overall network of
connections generates patterns of mutual exposure between any pair of directly or indirectly
connected firms, the magnitude of such exposure decreasing with their respective network
distance as well as on the degree (the number of links) of each firm. Thus, when a shock
hits a firm, any other firm in the same network component1 becomes affected in proportion
1As usual, a component of the network is defined as a maximal set of nodes (i.e. firms) that are directly
or indirectly connected.
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to its exposure to that firm and has to default when its share of the shock exceeds the value
of the firm’s assets, net of its liabilities. So, in the end, it is the overall ‘network’ structure
that determines how any given shock affects different firms and what is its overall aggregate
impact on the whole system.
In order to highlight our basic trade-off – insurance versus contagion – we focus most
of the analysis on just two dimensions of the network structure. One is the size of the
(disjoint) components into which the network is divided, i.e. the degree of segmentation
of the system. The other dimension is the “relative density ” of connections within each
component, as measured by the average network distance between a firm and any other
firm in a component.
Clearly, the maximum extent of risk sharing obtains when all firms belong to a single and
fully connected network. This configuration, however, exhibits the widest exposure of firms
in the system to shocks and a large shock, which would affect all firms in the system, could
lead to extensive default. There are two alternative (and in some cases complementary)
ways of reducing such exposure. One is by segmentation, which isolates the firms in each
component from the shocks that hit any other component. The second route to lowering
exposure is by reducing the density of connections in each component. This buffers the
network-mediated propagation of any shock that hits one of the firms in the component by
increasing its distance to other firms (which in turn reduces their exposure). To obtain a
sharp understanding of the effect of network density on contagion, our analysis will contrast
two polar cases: (i) completely connected components, where there is a direct link between
any pair of firms in each component; (ii) minimally connected (symmetric) components,
where each firm has the minimum number of links (i.e. two) required to obtain indirect
connectivity to every other firm in the component, thus firms are arranged in a ring. In the
first case the mutual exposure between any pair of firms in the same component is exactly
the same, while in the second case the reciprocal exposure between firms is heterogeneous,
falling with network distance.
The key objective of the paper will be to identify the architecture of the system that best
tackles the trade-off between risk sharing and contagion, hence minimizing the expected
number of defaults in the system. Our model, despite being very stylized, captures the
essence of the problem and allows the study of such a trade-off under a fairly general
structure of the random shocks. As this shock structure changes, our analysis will deliver
a precise determination of how the optimal degree of segmentation as well as optimal link
density correspondingly adapt.
A first set of our results can be summarized as follows. We find that when the probability
distribution of the shocks exhibits “fat tails” (i.e. attributes a high mass to large shocks),
the optimal configuration involves a maximum degree of segmentation – that is, components
should be of the minimum possible size. This reflects a situation where the priority is to
minimize contagion. Instead, in the opposite case where the probability distribution places
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high enough mass on relatively small shocks (“thin tails), the best configuration has all firms
arranged in a single component. The main aim in this latter case is to achieve the highest
level of risk sharing. These two polar cases, however, do not exhaust all possibilities. For we
also find that for other, more complex specifications of the shock structure (e.g. mixtures
of fat and thin tails) intermediate arrangements are optimal, i.e. the optimal degree of
segmentation involves medium-sized components.
It is interesting to note that all of the previous conclusions apply irrespectively of whether
one considers structures involving completely connected components or, alternatively, mini-
mally connected ones. As explained, the potential advantage of minimally connected struc-
tures is that the exposure between firms in a component is not uniform but decays with
network distance, which limits the number of defaults induced when the shocks are large. A
natural implication of this feature is that, among minimally connected structures, the opti-
mal degree of segmentation is lower (or, equivalently, the component size is larger) than for
completely connected ones. This conclusion notwithstanding, we find that when segmenta-
tion in complete components is implemented optimally, it always dominates segmentation
in minimally connected structures if the shock distributions are as described in the pre-
vious paragraph. It is however important to emphasize that for other, less regular shock
distributions a minimally connected structure is optimal (i.e. better than any segmentation
in complete components). This happens, for instance, when the shock distribution assigns
a high probability mass on a small range of large shocks as well as on a wide range of
small and medium size shocks. In those cases, we find that low density is preferred to more
segmentation as the mechanism for limiting contagion when the shocks are large.
The paper also addresses the issue of whether the requirements for the optimality of the
network structure of the system are compatible with the incentives of individual firms to
establish links. Formally, we analyze this issue by examining the Coalition-Proof Equilibria
(CPE) of a network formation game, where any group (i.e. coalition) of firms can jointly
deviate, to avoid the multiplicity issues associated to the coordination problems present in
these games. Our main conclusion is that there is typically a conflict between efficiency
and individual incentives. This conflict derives from the fact that CPE typically exhibit
heterogeneities in component size and these are inconsistent with efficiency. There are,
therefore, positive externalities associated to displaying a uniform size for all components
that are not internalized at CPE – in general, the equilibria have some firms that lie in a
component that is inefficiently small.
The results summarized so far refer to environments where all firms are ex ante identical
and thus operate at the same scale and face the same shock distribution. The paper,
however, also studies the case where firms may be different, either with regard to their
size or to their shock distribution. Under these circumstances, our main conclusion is
particularly sharp: if we focus on completely connected components, optimality requires
perfect assortativity. That is, any optimal configuration must have all firms arranged in
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homogeneous components (where within each of them firms are identical both in size and in
shock distributions). We also consider the implications of allowing for asymmetric network
structures, where the network position of firms within a component matters. In particular,
we contrast two situations: the symmetric configuration where components are completely
connected (and hence all firms are in a symmetric position), and the case where firms
are arranged in star networks (thus there is a large central firm connected to the smaller
peripheral ones). We find that the symmetric structure is optimal when the shocks are
not too large (because this maximizes risk-sharing possibilities) while the star structure is
optimal for bigger shocks. The latter reflects the fact that star networks limit contagion
when shocks are large, by restricting overall connectivity and having the central larger nodes
act as buffers.
To sum up, our analysis highlights that the efficient configuration of the pattern of
connections among financial firms – concerning, in particular, its segmentation, density,
and the handling of size asymmetries – crucially depends on the nature of the shocks faced
by the system. Since, as explained, one cannot generally expect that social and individual
incentives be aligned, an important role for policy opens up. Our model, of course, is too
stylized to allow for the formulation of concrete policy advice. It provides, however, a
theoretical framework that is useful to understand the core issues and trade-offs involved,
thus setting up the basis for the derivation of more specific policy implications.
We end this introduction with a brief review of the related literature. The research on
financial contagion and systemic risk is quite diverse and also fast-growing. Hence we shall
provide here only a brief summary of some of the more closely related papers.2
Allen and Gale (2000) pioneered the study of the stability of interconnected financial
systems. They analyze a model in the Diamond and Dybvig (1983) tradition, where a
single, completely connected component is always the efficient network structure, i.e. the
one that minimizes the extent of default. Our model, in contrast, shows that a richer shock
structure can generate a genuine trade-off between risk-sharing and contagion and that in
some circumstances a certain degree of segmentation and/or low density may turn out to
be efficient.
Freixas et al. (2000) consider an environment where a lower density of interaction,
even though it limits risk sharing, has the positive consequence of reducing the incentives
for deposit withdrawal. Concerning segmentation, on the other hand, a positive role for
it is obtained by Leitner (2005) in a model where, unlike ours, no role is played by the
interaction among agents in a component, since risk is always shared completely within
each component.
2The reader is referred to Allen and Babus (2009) for a recent survey on how risk sharing in financial
contexts can lead, through contagion, to large systemic effects. There is also a large body of literature that
studies the general problem of risk sharing in non financial contexts, largely motivated by its application to
consumption sharing in poor economies that lack formal insurance mechanisms. Paradigmatic examples are
the papers by Bramoulle´ and Kranton (2007), Bloch et al. (2008), and Ambrus et al. (2011).
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More in line with our approach, Allen et al. (2011) consider a six-firm environment
where each firm needs funds for its investment. Since these investments are risky, firms
may gain from risk diversification, which is achieved by exchanging shares with other firms.
This gives rise to a financial network for which two possibilities are considered: a segmented
and an unsegmented structure. The paper then analyses the different effects in these two
structures of the arrival of a signal indicating that some firm in the system will have to
default. Depending on parameters, either of these structures can dominate the other.
Two more recent, related papers are Elliott et al. (2012) and Acemoglu et al. (2013).
In the first one financial contagion is modelled in a similar way to ours, as the consequence
of cross-holdings among firms. Such cross-holdings, however, embody cross ownership of
equity shares among firms, rather than being the result of the securitization and exchange
of assets as here. This, together with the assumption that default brings about some fixed
bankruptcy costs, imply that the default of any given firm induces a discontinuous drop
in the revenue of all the firms owning its equity and may thus trigger a default chain. No
such discontinuities occur in our setup, where contagion arises only from the correlation in
returns that is induced by the firms’ exchanges of assets (i.e. by their joint ownership of
assets). Another difference with our paper concerns the main focus of the analysis. While
the aim of the aforementioned paper is to characterize conditions on the structure of the
network under which default cascades occur, the primary objective of ours is to characterize
the optimal financial structures in diverse scenarios and their consistency with individual
incentives.
The second paper, Acemoglu et al (2013), shares with the present one its concern with
the optimality and incentive-compatibility of financial networks but displays important
modelling differences in some key respects. On the one hand, the setup is one where
firms are required to engage in credit-borrowing relationships, and hence the risk-sharing
considerations in the model are only implicit. This feature also implies that the contagion
is channelled throughout the system in a manner that is different from our model. One of
the main results of their paper is that, depending on whether the magnitude of shocks is
small or large, the optimal network is either complete or has components almost isolated
from the rest. In contrast we characterize the optimal network structure for a non trivial
distribution function of the shocks, finding a richer pattern of optimal structures, which may
exhibit intermediate degrees of segmentation or different levels of link density. Finally, both
approaches find that a strategically stable configuration is not optimal, as agents do not
internalize the global network-based externalities imposed on others. The reasons, however,
are different in each case. While in Acemoglu et al (2013), the indicated externalities pertain
to the enhanced spreading of risk brought about by individual connections, in our case it
involves a distortion in the size of risk-sharing components.
There is also a complementary line of literature that, in contrast with the papers just
mentioned, studies the issue of contagion and systemic risk in the context of large networks
(usually, randomly generated). In many of these papers, the approach is numerical, based
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on large-scale simulations (see e.g. Nier et al. (2007)). A notable exception is the recent
paper by Blume et al. (2011), which integrates the mathematical theory of random networks
with the strategic analysis of network formation. Its primary aim is to address the question
of what is the socially optimal connectivity of the system (i.e. the average degree of the
network) and whether such optimal connectivity is consistent with agents’ incentives to
create or destroy links. They find that social optimality is attained around the threshold
where a large component emerges, but individuals will generally want to connect beyond
this point. As in our paper, this induces a conflict between social and individual optimality,
which in their case is due to the fact that agents do not internalize the effect on others of
adding new channels (i.e. links) that facilitate the spread of the effects of the shocks.
Finally, we should refer to the large empirical and policy-oriented literature whose main
objective is to devise summary measures of the network of inter-firm (mostly banks) rela-
tionships that is able to anticipate systemic failures. For example, Battiston et al. (2012)
propose a measure of centrality (Debtrank), inspired on the measure of Pagerank centrality
that Google uses to rank webpages). They take this measure, which takes into account the
feedback effect that failures can have on neighbors at different distances, and estimate its
value for US data. Similarly, Denbee et al. (2011) propose a measure of centrality a´ la
Katz-Bonacich, following Ballester, Calvo´-Armengol and Zenou (2006), and apply it to En-
glish data. Of particular interest in this respect is Elsinger, Lehar and Summer (2011) who,
using Austrian data, show that correlation in banks’ asset portfolios is the main source of
systemic risk. This is very much in line with our model, which precisely highlights portfolio
correlation as the key driver of default risk.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model, including the
continuum approximation that proves very convenient in the analysis. Section 3 character-
izes optimal financial structures for various properties of the shock distribution. Section 4
addresses the network formation problem and studies the tension between strategic stability
and optimality. Section 5 considers different extensions to environments with asymmetries,
in particular concerning the size of firms, the distribution of their shocks, or the underlying
network architecture. Finally, Section 6 concludes with a summary and a short outline of
pending research issues. For convenience, all formal proofs of our results are relegated to
an Appendix.
2 The Model
2.1 The Environment
We consider an environment with N ex ante identical, risk-neutral financial firms and a
continuum of small investors. At any given point in time, each firm has an investment
opportunity - a project - which requires an initial payment I = 1 and yields a random
gross return R˜ at the end of the period. The resources needed to undertake the project
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are obtained by issuing liabilities (e.g. deposits or bonds) on which a deterministic rate of
return must be paid.
The gross return of the project is random, as with some probability q the firm is hit
by a negative shock. If no shock hits, the return equals some normal level R. The shock
can in turn be small (which we label as s) or large (labelled b), with respective conditional
probabilities pis and pib. When a small shock hits, the firm experiences a loss of some fixed
size Ls, so its gross return is R − Ls. When the shock is large, the loss L˜b is a random
variable, with support [Ls,∞) and cumulative distribution function Φ(Lb). Summarizing,
the gross return on a firm’s project is:
R˜ =

R with prob. 1− q
R− Ls with prob. q pis
R− L˜b with prob. q pib
(1)
Since the return on a firm’s investment is subject to shocks, while the return promised
to its creditors is deterministic, when the firm is hit by a shock it may be unable to meet
the required payments on its liabilities, in which case it must default. Default entails two
types of costs. First, there are the liquidations costs – for simplicity, we assume that these
costs leave no resources available to make any payment to creditors at the time of default.
In addition, there are additional costs deriving from the fact that a defaulting firm stops
operating and hence loses any future earnings possibility. These costs are assumed to be
substantial, so that the value of a firm is maximized when its probability of default at any
point in time is minimized.
There is a large set of investors, who are the source of the supply of funds to firms.
Investors are risk neutral and require an expected gross rate of return equal to r in order
to lend their funds in any given period. Since firms may default, in which case creditors
receive a payment equal to zero, the nominal gross rate of return M on the deposits to the
firms must be greater or equal than r. Specifically, if we denote by ϕ the ex ante probability
that any given firm defaults (an endogenous variable), we must have:
M =
r
1− ϕ. (2)
For the risk of default to be an issue, we assume:
A1. (i) R (1− q) > r
(ii) R− Ls < r.
The first inequality ensures that a firm’s project is viable, that is, its expected return
exceeds what must be paid to lenders. On the other hand, the second inequality implies
(since r ≤ M and L˜b ≥ Ls) that if a firm can only draw on the revenue generated by its
project, it is surely unable to pay depositors (and hence must default) whenever a shock
(whether s or b) hits its return.
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Since, as stated above, default entails a significant cost for a firm, a firm may benefit
from entering risk sharing arrangements with other firms and hence diversify risks. Here we
consider the case where these arrangements take the form of swaps of assets between firms,
that is, exchanges of claims to the yields of the firms’ investments, prior to the realization
of the uncertainty (similarly to Allen, Babus and Carletti (2011)). The possibly iterative
procedure through which each firm exchanges shares on its whole array of asset holdings
can be viewed as a securitization process of the firms’ claims.
More precisely, let us posit that each firm exchanges a fraction 1 − θ of its standing
shares, giving rights to the return on its investments, for shares held by other firms. Such
an exchange entitles the firm to a fraction of the returns on the other firms’ investments.
Note that, due to the ex ante symmetry of firms, this exchange takes place on a one for
one basis, as it involves assets of equal expected return. The specific pattern of exchanges
among firms is formalized by a network, where a direct linkage between two firms reflects
the fact that they undertake a direct exchange of their assets. We allow for these asset
swaps to occur repeatedly. Indirect connections are then also formed, whereby a firm ends
up having claims on the returns of projects of firms who swapped assets with the firms
it exchanges assets with, and so on. As a consequence a pair of firms lying at a certain
distance in the network will have some reciprocal exposure to the yields of each other’s
projects provided the number of exchange rounds is high enough – in particular, as high as
their network distance.
As a result of this process of asset exchanges, the return on a firm’s assets becomes a
weighted average of the yield of its own project and the yields of the projects of the firms
it exchanged assets with, directly or indirectly. A convenient way of representing a network
structure is through a matrix A of the form
A =

a11 a12 · · · a1N
a21 a22 · · · a2N
...
...
. . .
...
aN1 aN2 · · · aNN
 (3)
where, for each i, j, (i 6= j), aij ≥ 0 denotes the fraction of shares in the investment project
run by firm i that is owned by firm j. By construction, the following adding-up constraints
must then hold:
N∑
j=i
aij = 1 i = 1, 2...., N (4)
In addition, given that, for the moment, all firms are assumed ex-ante symmetric it is
natural to focus our attention on the case where the pattern of asset exchanges is also
symmetric across firms. This, together with the fact that all portfolio swaps are conducted
on a one-for-one basis imply that A is symmetric, i.e.
aij = aji for all i, j = 1, 2, ..., N.
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In what follows we shall compare different network configurations in terms of social
welfare. Our assumptions that default costs are very significant and that all firms are risk
neutral and ex ante identical imply that social welfare is maximized when the expected
number of defaults in the system is minimized.3 It can be easily checked that this criterion
is equivalent to that of minimizing the individual probability that any single firm defaults.4
Thus, from an ex ante viewpoint, we have that social and individual objectives are aligned.
We shall assume that all network structures involve the same “externalization of risk”
by each firm. That is, each firm, after all rounds of asset exchanges have been completed,
holds a claim to the same fraction α of the yield of its own project, and the residual fraction
1− α of claims to other firms’ projects. Formally, this amount to making aii = α for each
i = 1, .., N and every network configuration. Alternative structures, therefore, differ only
in terms of how the fraction 1− α of the risk that is externalized is distributed among the
rest of the firms. This allows a meaningful comparison across different network structures.
The value of α, a parameter of the model, is taken to be at least as large as 1/2. Such a
lower bound on α may be motivated by considerations of moral hazard.5 Indeed, if in order
to operate one’s project some costly effort needs to be exerted, a standard way to induce a
high enough effort level is to make sure that the firm retains some minimum share of the
project’s returns.6 On the other hand, an upper bound on the fraction of claims retained
to its own project is explained by the benefits of risk sharing and the fact that, as we will
see below, a situation with all firms in isolation is never optimal.
We assume that shocks are rare and thus each period at most one firm is hit by a
shock. Given (1), this can be motivated by postulating that, even if shocks hit firms in a
stochastically independent manner, the probability q that a shock hits any given firm is so
low that the probability that two or more shocks arrive in a single period is of an order of
3Beale et al. (2011) propose a similar criterion to evaluate and compare different financial systems, based
on the minimization of a “systemic cost function” defined as the expectation of a convex function of the
number of defaults in the system. Thus, in this case, not only the expected number of defaults matters, but
also its variability.
4To see this, note that the ex ante probability of default of an individual firm ϕ is equal to
∑
m ρ(m)ϕ(m),
where ρ(m) stands for the probability that m firms default and ϕ(m) for the conditional probability that
any particular firm defaults when there are a total of m defaults in the system. Then, since
ϕ(m) =
1
N
+ (1− 1
N
)
1
N − 1 + · · ·+ (1−
1
N
− · · · − 1
N
)
1
N −m+ 1 =
m
N
we obtain that the expected number of defaults in the system is
∑
m ρ(m)m = ϕN , i.e. is proportional to
the individual default probability.
5This requirement is analogous, for example, to a well-known provision in the recent Dodd-Frank act
passed in the USA to strengthen the regulation of the financial system. By virtue of this new legislation,
under certain circumstances “a securitizer is required to retain not less than 5 percent of the credit risk...”
(see http://www.sec.gov/about/laws/wallstreetreform-cpa.pdf).
6In particular, the lower bound of 1/2 ensures that a firm always retains a larger share of claims on its
project than any other firm.
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magnitude that can be ignored.7
When a shock of size L hits the return on the project run by some firm i, the exposure
to it by each one of the firms in the system is given by the vector AeiL, where ei is the i-th
unit vector [0, .., 1, ..0]>. Hence firm i defaults in response to such a shock when
α(R− L) +
∑
j 6=i
aijR < M, that is, αL > R−M,
while any firm k 6= i defaults wheneverα+ ∑
i 6=j 6=k
akj
R + aki(R− L) < M.
We readily see from the above expressions that when a firm exchanges its assets with other
firms, the firm reduces its exposure to the shocks hitting its own project but at the same
time becomes exposed to the shocks affecting the projects of those firms with which the
firm in question is directly or indirectly connected.
On the nature of those shocks, we make the following key assumption:
A2. (i) pis > Npib.
(ii) α(R− Ls) + (1− α)R ≥ r1−Nqpib .
Part (i) of the above assumption says that s (small) shocks are significantly more likely
than b (big) ones. In particular, it is more likely that a given firm is hit directly by a s shock
than a b shock hits any of the firms. Part (ii) then ensures that, by exchanging a fraction
1−α of its shares with shares of other firms, no firm defaults when a s shock hits any firm
in the environment. The term on the right-hand side of A2(ii) constitutes an upper bound
on the gross rate of return M on deposits when no default occurs with an s shock, since the
probability of default ϕ of a firm is no larger than Nqpib, which is the probability that a b
shock hits anywhere in the system. On the other hand, the term on the left-hand side of
the inequality in A2(ii) constitutes the gross return of a firm that swapped a fraction 1−α
of its shares in the event where the firm is hit by a s shock. Since α ≥ 1/2 this term is also
a lower bound on the firm’s revenue when any other firm in the system is hit by a s shock.
The inequality in A2(ii), therefore, implies that asset exchange and securitization – i.e.
the establishment of links – allows firms to fully insure against the s shocks. But, on the
other hand, diversification also exposes a firm to the risk of contagion when a b shock hits
any of the firms directly or indirectly linked to the firm. Recall, however, that Assumptions
A1(ii) and A2(i) imply that a firm in isolation always defaults when hit by a s shock and
that s shocks are much more likely than b shocks. This implies that the probability of
7Or, as an extreme formalization of this idea, we could model time continuously and assume that the
arrivals of small and big shocks to each firm are governed by independent Poisson processes with fixed rates
pis and pib, respectively.
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default of a firm is always lower when it exchanges assets with other firms than when it is
in autarky, and therefore guarantees that every firm will always want to display some links
to others.
While any pattern of asset exchanges allows firms to attain full insurance against s
shocks, the default performance in the event of b shocks will typically not be the same
across different financial network structures. In general, that is, these structures will be
markedly different in terms of the extent of contagion they induce when big shocks hit the
system. Indeed, to understand which configurations minimize those detrimental side effects
of risk-sharing is one of the primary aims of this paper.
Remark 1 We should point out that in the environment considered the mutual exposure
between firms comes from the cross-ownership of their shares, not from mutual lending relation-
ships. Hence the default of one firm has no direct implication for the solvency of other firms,
the possibility of contagion of a large shock hitting a firm only coming from the correlation of
their portfolio returns.
2.2 Financial Structures
We shall consider financial structures that differ along two dimensions: segmentation and
network density. For the moment, we shall also restrict our analysis to symmetric config-
urations – which means, in particular, that all components of the network are of identical
size and have the same network density. This, however, implies no loss of generality for our
normative analysis since, as we will show, the welfare maximizing configurations are sym-
metric. In contrast, in Section 4, where the implications of strategic stability are examined,
we will allow for asymmetries in component sizes.
By segmentation we mean the partition of the N firms into disjoint components. Each
component is formed by firms that are either directly or indirectly linked by the exchange of
assets (and hence the cross-ownership of shares), while there is no exchange across compo-
nents. The measure of the segmentation is given by the number C of equal-sized components
in which the set of firms is divided, or equivalently by the number K ≡ NC − 1 of other
firms to whom every firm is linked.8 In terms of the matrix A, this amounts to having a
block diagonal structure with C blocks along the diagonal. The larger the segmentation,
the lower the number K of firms indirectly affected by a given shock but, ceteris paribus,
the larger their mutual exposure and hence the probability of default if a b shock hits them.
At the two extremes of segmentation, we have the case K = N − 1, where all firms are
connected (directly or indirectly), and K = 1, where each firm only engages in trade with
a single other firm. We shall allow for all possible values of K between 1 and N − 1 and
explore their welfare implications.
8We ignore for now all possible integer problems regarding these magnitudes.
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By network density we refer to the proportion of direct versus indirect linkages within
each component. As we said in the previous section, a firm is directly linked to another one
if the two are involved in a direct exchange of assets. Instead, two firms are only indirectly
linked if they are connected by a multiple-link path in the financial network. In this case,
they will end up holding claims to each other’s projects once there has been a repeated
exchange of assets (repeated rounds of securitization). In general, we can have different
levels of density, ranging from 1 (all linkages are direct) to the case where the amount of
direct connectivity is minimal (i.e. 2/K, which is attained in the ring, as explained below).
For simplicity, our analysis will just compare these two extremes, which are described in
more detail in what follows.
For the choice of the financial structure to be non trivial, we assume that the number
of firms in the system is not too small, that is:
A3. N > 4.
Minimally Connected Structures In this case firms display the minimum number of
links required to be connected, directly or indirectly (i.e. through a path of some length),
to all other firms in the component. In a symmetric component, it must then be that all
firms have exactly two links and the architecture is that of a ring. Let K (the number of
“other” firms in a component) parametrize the degree of segmentation of the system. Then,
for some suitable labelling of the firms, the pattern of direct exchanges of assets among the
firms in any given component is described by a (K + 1)× (K + 1) matrix of the form
BK =

θ (1− θ)/2 0 · · · 0 (1− θ)/2
(1− θ)/2 θ (1− θ)/2 · · · 0 0
...
...
...
. . .
...
...
(1− θ)/2 0 0 · · · (1− θ)/2 θ
 , (5)
where θ is the fraction of assets that each firm retains for itself and the rest is exchanged
with its two trading partners. These asset exchanges are iterated m times in a repeated
process of securitization. In the second round, each firm trades the composite asset given
by claims on its project and on those of its two neighbors as obtained in the first round.
By exchanging these assets the firm acquires claims on the projects of firms that are at
network distance two, i.e. the neighbors of its neighbors. And so on. The pattern of
exposures among firms in the component at the end of this process is described by the
matrix AK , obtained by repeated composition of the matrix BK with itself m times, i.e.
AK = (BK)
m. (6)
We posit that m = K/2. This is the minimal value of m that ensures that any pair of firms
that are either directly or indirectly linked with each other end up with a non-zero share in
each other’s projects. It is the minimal number of iterations required for all entries of AK to
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be strictly positive, so that all firms in the component bear some reciprocal exposure. It is
immediate to see that this exposure falls with the network distance among any two firms in
the ring: the entries of AK satisfy aij > alq when |i− j| < |l − q|.9 Finally, note that θ must
be set at a level such that, as required in the general specification in the previous section,
each firm retains a fraction α of claims on its own project; that is, all the main-diagonal
entries of the matrix AK have to be equal to α.
Complete Structures This corresponds to the situation where all firms in each com-
ponent are directly linked among them – so, in the language of networks, all components
are completely connected. In this case, the exchange of assets among firms within the
component is captured by a square matrix AK of the form:
AK =

α (1− α)/K · · · (1− α)/K
(1− α)/K α · · · (1− α)/K
...
...
. . .
...
(1− α)/K (1− α)/K · · · α
 , (7)
where, as before, α is the fraction of its own assets a firm keeps for itself. Evidently, the
pattern of exposures described by the above matrix would not change if the exchanges were
iterated and hence we can set m = 1 with no loss of generality.
In the next sections we compare the performance with regard to shocks of alternative
financial structures differing in the two above dimensions. As explained, optimality is
identified with the minimization of the expected number of defaults when shocks hit the
system. Our primary objective will then be to determine the optimal degree of segmentation
(that is, the optimal size of the components) as well as the optimal network density (that
is, whether it is preferable to have a ring or a completely connected structure), depending
on the characteristics of the shock distribution.
Let ϕ (A; Φ(·)) denote the probability of bankruptcy of an arbitrary firm i when the
financial network structure is described by the matrix A and the distribution of the b
shocks is given by the cumulative distribution function Φ(·) defined on R. We have so:
ϕ (A; Φ(·)) =
qpib Pr {α (R− Lb) + (1− α)R) < M}+ qpib
∑N
j 6=i Pr {R−M < aijLb}
(8)
where M satisfies (2). The first term on the right hand side is the probability of default
when a b shock hits the firm under consideration, the second term is the probability of
default of the same firm when a b shock hits any of the other N −1 firms. By the symmetry
of A the probability of default is the same and given by the above expression for all i.
9It is immediate to see that the same properties hold for any other m ≥ K/2. As m → ∞, the limit
matrix AK has all off-diagonal entries with the same value, which is the same property exhibited by complete
structures, as we see below.
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As argued before,10 the expected number of defaults in the system is ϕ (A; Φ(·))N .
Hence the optimal financial structure is given by the value of K and the network density
for which ϕ (A; Φ(·)) is minimal. It is worth highlighting that the first term on the second
line of (8) is independent of the financial structure, as it does not depend on A. That is,
the probability of default of a firm whose project is hit by a b shock is the same across all
structures considered. These only differ in their ability to limit contagion – that is, in how
effective they are in preventing large b shocks from inducing the default of firms connected
to the one directly hit by the shock.
In the environment considered there is no cost of forming linkages, still we will see
that the problem of identifying the optimal structure is a non trivial one and that this
sometimes displays fewer connections than in a completely connected component. This is
a key feature of our analysis that stands in marked contrast with the conclusions derived
from the models studied in earlier work as, for instance, Allen and Gale (2001) or Allen,
Babus, Carletti (2011).
The Continuum Approximation
The pattern of risk exposure induced by either the complete or the ring structures can be
graphically depicted through a function that, for each firm i, specifies the fraction of the
claims to the yield of the project of firm i that is held by any other firm j in the component.
This pattern is given by a function of the corresponding network distances of other firms
to i and is captured by the terms on the corresponding row of the matrix AK . Given the
assumption that α ≥ 1/2 the “exposure function” always reaches the highest value when
i = j. In the particular case of the complete structure it takes a constant value for all other
j 6= i, while for the ring it is a step function that is monotonically decreasing.
Because of the discreteness of the domain of this function – in particular, for the case
of the ring structure – and the integer problems faced in the determination of the optimal
degree of segmentation a formal analysis of the firms’ probability of default for different
network configurations becomes quite involved and tedious to carry out. To render the
analysis more tractable, we study in what follows a continuum approximation of our model
that abstracts from these considerations but still allows to capture the essential features of
the problem. It involves approximating the discrete function ϕ (A; Φ(·)) by a continuous
real function that embodies the same features as the original one.11
In the continuum approximation of the model, N is taken to be the measure of the firms
in the system, while K + 1 is the generic notation used to represent the measure of firms
10See footnote 4.
11This continuum formulation can be seen as representing a limit description of a context consisting of a
large number of firms, each of them of small (relative) size. This interpretation, however, is not essential,
so we prefer to view it simply as a continuous approximation of a context where the number of firms is not
necessarily large.
15
belonging to a certain component. The returns on a firm’s project are the same as in (1).
To keep a formal parallelism with the discrete formulation, when a shock occurs it is taken
to hit directly a unit mass of firms in one component. This mass of firms, therefore, plays
the role of the single firm directly hit by a shock in the discrete context.
Segmentation is modelled as in the previous section, except that the size of a component,
K + 1, need not be an integer and can now be any real positive number lying between 1
and N . Differences in network density, on the other hand, are modelled as follows.
If the component is complete, the pattern of exposure to the returns on other firms’
projects is as in the discrete model: the indirect exposure, to a shock that hits any other firm
in the component, is constant and equal to (1−α)/K. On the other hand, if the component
has a ring structure, the pattern of risk exposure is now described by a continuous function
f(d;K), where d ∈ [0,K/2] is the ring distance to the set of firms directly hit by the shock.
This function has the following form:
f(d;K) = α− α−HH d for 0 ≤ d ≤ H
= HKK−2H − 2HK−2H d for H < d < K/2
= 0 for d = K/2.
(9)
for some suitably computed H. The function f(·) is defined for all K ≥ 1, with the value
of H being determined by the following adding-up constraint:
2
∫ K/2
0
f(x;K)dx = (α−H)H + 2H2 +H (K/2−H) = 1− α, (10)
which reflects the requirement that firms externalize the fraction (1−α) of their risk. This
condition leads to
H =
2(1− α)
K + 2α
. (11)
Recalling that α ≥ 1/2 and K ≥ 1, it is immediate to verify that the function f(d;K)
exhibits the following properties that match those of the exposure function in the discrete
set-up:
f(d;K) is positive and decreasing for all K/2 > d > 0, (12)
f(0) = α, (13)
f(K/2) = 0. (14)
First, (12) says that every firm in a component is affected by a shock hitting any other firm
in the component, but with an intensity that decreases with the distance to the source of
the shock. In addition, (13) states that the level of exposure to a firm at minimal distance
is the same as that to a direct shock, while (14) says that the exposure becomes vanishing
small when the distance to the source of the shock is maximal in the component. Conditions
(12), (13), and (14), together with the adding-up constraint (10) on the total fraction of the
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risk externalized by firms, capture the essential features displayed by the exposure function
in the discrete setup.
Note that f(d;K) is a two-piece linear function with the kink at the bisectrix (i.e. at
a distance d = H such that f(H) = H). It is concave or convex depending on whether,
respectively, K is smaller or larger than 2(1−α)/α. An illustration of how it approximates
the original function for the discrete setup is displayed in Figure 1.
10 10 
f(d;20) 
d d 
d=0 
Figure 1: Continuum approximation of the exposure function. The step function describes
the exposure in a ring with K + 1 = 21 firms, as a function of the distance d to either side
of the location occupied by any given firm. The exposure is the one induced by the matrix
A20 ≡ (B20)10, with B20 being the matrix of asset exchange specified in (5). In contrast,
the solid line describes the exposure for the continuum approximation f(d, 10).
Using the above specification of the exposure function for the ring and the complete
structures, for any possible level of K, we are now in a position to determine the extent of
default induced by any given shock of magnitude L for alternative financial structures. Note
first that, as already argued for the discrete context, whether the unit mass of adjacent firms
directly hit by a shock default or not is independent of the underlying financial network
structure. For those firms will default if, and only if,
L >
R−M
α
.
If the former inequality is violated and the firms hit by the shock do not default, no other
firm in the corresponding component defaults either. This simply follows from the fact that
α ≥ (1 − α)/K since α ≥ 1/2, K ≥ 1 and f(d;K) ≤ α for any d ≥ 0. But if those firms
directly affected by the shock do default, what happens to all the others in the component
naturally depends on the size K+1 of the component and on the pattern of the connections
within it.
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In the case where firms are connected through a complete interaction pattern, the unifor-
mity of the exposure has the following immediate implication: all firms indirectly affected
(i.e. not hit by the shock but lying in the component affected) will default if
L >
K
1− α (R−M) (15)
whereas none of those firms will default otherwise. Thus, if we let gc(L;K) stand for the
mass of firms that default when the shock hits some other firm in their component, that
magnitude is given by the following step function:
gc(L;K;M) =
{
0 if L ≤ K1−α (R−M)
K if L > K1−α (R−M)
(16)
In contrast, when the firms in the component are connected through a ring interaction
pattern (as captured by the exposure pattern f(·)), the conclusion is, in general, not so
dichotomic. For, in this case, whether any particular firm in the component defaults or not
depends on its ring distance d to those firms that have been directly affected. Such a firm
defaults if, and only if,
L >
1
f(d;K)
(R−M) ,
which is to be contrasted with (15). Hence the threshold that marks the relevant “default
range” is given by the distance dˆ such that
f(dˆ;K) =
R−M
L
, (17)
so that a firm defaults if, and only if, its distance d from the set of firms directly hit by the
shock is such that d < dˆ. Under a ring structure, therefore, the effect of different levels of
the shock on the mass of firms defaulting is not discontinuous as in the complete structure.
Rather, as the magnitude L of the shock increases, the mass of firms defaulting among those
indirectly affected by it grows gradually (see Figure 2 for an illustration), as determined by
the function gr(L;K,M) ≡ 2f−1((R−M) /L;K) given by:
gr(L;K,M) =

0 for L ≤ R−Mα
2αH
α−H − 2Hα−H R−ML for R−Mα ≤ L ≤ R−MH
K − K−2HH R−ML for L ≥ R−MH
(18)
3 Optimal Financial Structures
In this section we identify the optimal network segmentation and network density. That is,
we determine the financial structure that minimizes the expected mass of firms that default,
in the continuum approximation of the model. To this end, we rely on the functions given
in (18), and (16) that specify, respectively, the mass of firms defaulting in a component with
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Figure 2: The function gr(L; 20,M), specifying the mass of firms that default when indi-
rectly hit in a component of size K + 1 = 21 for any given magnitude L of the b shock,
plotted for α = 1/2 and the normalization R−M = 1, as posited below.
a complete or ring structure. The choice variables are not only the number C of different
components in the system, but also the sizeKi+1 of each component i, i = 1, .., C. We allow,
therefore, for the possibility of asymmetric structures, with components of possibly different
size. As explained in the previous section, the minimization of the expected mass of defaults
is equivalent to the minimization of the probability that any given firm defaults. Hence,
focusing on the latter, our optimization problem can be formulated as the minimization of
the following magnitudes:
ϕν = qNpib
(
1
N
Π +
C∑
i=1
Ki + 1
N
Ki
N
Egν(L˜b;Ki,M)
Ki
)
(19)
where the subindex ν = c, r signifies that either a complete or a ring structure is considered,
and Π is the probability that a firm defaults when directly hit by a b shock (which is the
same for all structures since α is also the same across structures). The above expression
reflects the fact that, when heterogeneous components are allowed, the ex-ante probability
that any firm defaults is the average weighted probability that firms in each component
default.
Consider first a fixed structure ν ∈ {c, r}. Then, discarding irrelevant terms in (19),
the optimal degree of segmentation is obtained as a solution of the following optimization
problem:
minKi,C
∑C
i=1
Ki+1
N Egν(L˜b;Ki,M)
s.t.
∑C
i=1
Ki+1
N = 1
(20)
We will show that the solution is (essentially) symmetric for all cases under consideration,
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with Ki = K for all i. This implies that problem (20) can be reduced to minimizing
Egν(L˜b;K,M) with respect to K. Then, by comparing the optimum values of the solution
of (20) for ν = r and ν = c we obtain the optimal network density.
Note that the value of Egν(L˜b;K,M) depends not only on the distribution Φ(Lb) but
also on the other parameters of the model, α,R, r, Ls. The specific values of these parameters
have however little interesting bearing on the analysis and our primary focus is on the effects
of the shock distribution on the optimal network structure. Hence in what follows we set12
α = 1/2, normalize R− r to unity and set also Ls = 1. Furthermore, even though M is an
endogenous variable (determined by (2)) and varies with the underlying network structure,
for the purpose of determining the optimal structure we can make it equal to r (and hence
R−M = 1) if qNpib is small.
To see this, let MF (qNpib) denote the function specifying the value of M that satisfies
the required arbitrage condition (2) under financial structure F , given by a pattern of
interaction ν ∈ {c, r} and component sizes K1, ...,Kn all displaying the pattern ν, when
the probability of the arrival of a b shock is qNpib. Substituting equation (19) into (2),
MF (qNpib) is defined implicitly by the following equation:
MF (qNpib)
[
1− qNpib
(
1
N
Π +
C∑
i=1
Ki + 1
N
Egν(L˜b;Ki,MF (qNpib))
N
)]
= r.
Since the function Egν(L˜b;Ki,MF (qNpib)) is bounded for each ν ∈ {c, r}, as we see from
(18), (16), MF (qNpib) is continuous in qNpib at qNpib = 0. Hence, if structure F1 yields a
higher expected mass of defaults when indirectly hit by a b shock than structure F2, i.e.
CF1∑
i=1
KF1i + 1
N
Egν(L˜b;Ki,MF1 (0))
N
>
CF2∑
i=1
KF2i + 1
N
Egν(L˜b;Ki,MF2 (0))
N
,
then we also have, for qNpib sufficiently small,
CF1∑
i=1
KF1i + 1
N
Egν(L˜b;Ki,MF1 (qNpib))
N
>
CF2∑
i=1
KF2i + 1
N
Egν(L˜b;Ki,MF2 (qNpib))
N
,
Therefore, in identifying the optimal structure, we can set M = MF (0) = r and thus have
R−M = 1.
We organize our formal analysis in the rest of this section in three parts. First, in
Subsection 3.1 we identify some clear-cut conditions regarding the probability distribution
of the b shocks under which the optimal segmentation is one of the two polar extremes –
12A convenient consequence of this choice of α is that, just as for the discrete version of the model, the
pattern of exposure is exactly the same for the complete and the ring structure if the component size is the
smallest (i.e. K = 1). The difference between the two structures then grows wider the higher is K.
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maximal or minimal – and the optimal degree of connectivity is complete. Then, in Subsec-
tion 3.2 we extend the analysis to more general specifications of the shock distribution, for
which intermediate levels of segmentation are optimal. Finally, in Subsection 3.3 we identify
scenarios where the optimal structure exhibits not only intermediate levels of segmentation
but also low density of connections, as embodied by the ring structure.
3.1 Polarized segmentation
In order to get a clear understanding of the forces at work, we shall start by examining the
case where the probability distribution of the b shocks is of the Pareto family with support
[1,∞) and density γ/Lγ+1b . By modulating the decay parameter γ, this formulation already
allows the discussion of many questions of interest such as the contrast between fat and
thin tails in the shock distribution (i.e. between scenarios where large shocks are relatively
frequent or not). As mentioned above, our analysis will be carried out in two steps. Firstly,
we shall characterize how γ affects the optimal degree of segmentation (as described by K)
for the ring and for the complete structure. Secondly, we shall compare these two structures.
Let Dr(K, γ) = Eγgc(L˜b;K) denote the expected mass of firms in a ring of size K + 1
who default when indirectly hit by a b shock with a Pareto distribution with parameter γ
(that is, when the shock hits some other firm in the component). We have:13:
Dr(K, γ) =
∫∞
1 gr(L;K) dΦ(L; γ)
=
∫∞
R−M
H
(
K − K−2HH 1L
) γ
Lγ+1
dL+
∫ R−M
H
R−M
α
(
2αH
α−H − 2Hα−H 1L
)
γ
Lγ+1
dL
= γ
[
K 1γ(K+1)γ − [K(K + 1)− 2] 1(γ+1)(K+1)γ+1
]
+
2γ
[
− 1K−1 1γ(K+1)γ + 2K−1 1(γ+1)(K+1)γ+1 + 1K−1 1γ 2γ − 2K−1 1(γ+1)2γ+1
] (21)
We study next how the above expression behaves as K varies in its admissible range
(recall that the minimum14 admissible value of K is 1 and its maximal value is N − 1). We
establish in the following proposition that whenever γ > 1 (i.e. the distribution function
of L˜b does not have fat tails) Dr(K, γ) attains a minimum at the highest value of K, i.e.
N − 1. On the other hand, when γ < 1 (i.e. the distribution has fat tails) the function
attains a minimum at K = 1.
Lemma 1 When the shock L˜b has a Pareto distribution, the component size which minimizes
the mass of firms defaulting is minimal (K = 1) if γ > 1, and maximal (K = N − 1) if γ < 1.
13Henceforth we shall use the parameter values α = 1/2 and R−M = 1 specified at the end of the previous
section and omit the argument M (= R − 1) in the functions throughout. Also, these values imply that
H = 1/(K + 1).
14Strictly speaking, the expression in (21) holds for K > 1. For K = 1 we have Dr(1, γ) =
γ
[
K 1
γ(K+1)γ
− [K(K + 1)− 2] 1
(γ+1)(K+1)γ+1
]
. However, since we show in the proof of Lemma 1 that
Dr(K, γ) is continuous at K = 1, in what follows it suffices to work with (21).
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On this basis, we can easily determine the optimal segmentation pattern in the system.
To this end we must also take into account the constraint present in (20),
∑C
i=1(Ki+1)/N =
1. Given the findings of the above lemma, this constraint only binds when N is odd and
γ < 1, as in such case a structure with all components of the optimal (minimal) size 2 is not
feasible. To find the optimal structure in this case we establish the concavity of Dr(K, γ) :
Lemma 2 When γ < 1 the function Dr(K, γ) is strictly concave in K, for all K > 1.
From Lemmas 1 and 2 it immediately follows that the optimal ring structure when
γ < 1 and N is odd is “almost” symmetric, with N2 − 1 components of minimal size 2 and a
residual component of size 3. In all other cases, the optimal ring structure is the one with
all components of the same optimal size, determined in Lemma 1. We can then summarize
our findings in the following statement:
Proposition 1 Suppose the shock L˜b has a Pareto distribution. With γ > 1 (no fat tails)
the optimal degree of segmentation for the ring structure is minimal, with a single component
including all N firms. Otherwise, with γ < 1 segmentation is maximal, with all components of
the minimal size 2 (except one, of size 3, when N is odd).
The previous result shows that there is indeed a trade-off between risk sharing and
contagion. On the one hand, when the distribution of the shocks exhibits fat tails (hence
large shocks are relatively likely), the predominant consideration is to control contagion
rather than achieve risk sharing. Hence the expected number of defaults is minimized by
breaking the network into disjoint components of minimal size, which limits the extent
to which a shock may spread its consequences far into the system. Instead, when the
distribution has no fat tails, the most important consideration becomes risk-sharing, which
is maximized by placing all firms in a single component.
Next, we turn to studying the analogous question for the case where the components are
completely connected. In this case, the expected mass of firms who default in a completely
connected component of size K + 1 when indirectly hit by a b shock is:
Dc(K, γ) = Eγgc(L˜b;K) = K Pr (L ≥ 2K) = K
(
1
2K
)γ
. (22)
Hence
∂Dc
∂K
= − (γ − 1)
(
1
2K
)γ
≷ 0 ⇐⇒ γ ≶ 1,
which readily implies that the optimal component size is again minimal when γ < 1 (the
shock distribution has fat tails), while it is maximal in the case where γ > 1. Hence the
optimal segmentation structure is the same as for the ring, with all components of the
optimal size when the constraint
∑C
i=1(Ki + 1)/N = 1 does not bind. In contrast, when
γ < 1 and N odd, and hence the former constraint binds, the optimal structure is different
from the one obtained for the ring in this situation. It is now exactly symmetric, with N−12
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components, all of the same size (slightly larger than 2). This is because, as we show in the
proof of the next proposition, Dc(·) is a convex function of K (remember that Dr(·) is a
concave function of K). Hence we have the following:
Proposition 2 When the shock L˜b has a Pareto distribution, the optimal degree of segmen-
tation for the completely connected structure is minimal (one single component) if γ > 1, and
maximal, with N/2 ((N − 1)/2 if N is odd) identical components, if γ < 1.
Finally, we need to compare the optimally segmented ring and complete network struc-
tures in order to identify which of the two is optimal when not only segmentation but also
network density can be chosen. In view of Propositions 1 and 2, it is enough to compare
the expected mass of firms defaulting under either maximal or minimum segmentation for
the ring and the complete structures when, respectively, γ is lower or higher than unity.
Note also that when K is at its minimal admissible value, 1, the pattern of exposure is
the same for the two structures, gc(Lb; 1) = gr(Lb; 1), hence a difference only arises when
the optimal component size is greater than 1 for at least one structure. This leads to the
following result.
Proposition 3 If the shock L˜b has a Pareto distribution, for all values of γ < 1, when N is
even the optimal structure is equivalently completely connected or a ring structure, while for all
γ > 1 and for N large enough (N > 1 + (1 + γ)
1
γ−1 ) the complete network strictly dominates
the ring structure.
Combining the results obtained in this subsection, we conclude that if shocks are Pareto
distributed, the optimal network always displays maximal density and polarized (maximum
or minimum) segmentation. In this case, therefore, the whole adjustment to the underlying
risk conditions (i.e. to the different values of γ ) is obtained only by varying the segmentation
pattern. However, as our subsequent analysis will show, neither the optimality of the
polarized segmentation pattern nor of the complete connectivity within components are
features maintained for other, more complex, shock distributions.
3.2 Intermediate Degrees of Segmentation
Propositions 1 and 2 establish that, when the distribution of the shocks has a simple Pareto
structure and thus it either has, or does not have, fat tails, the optimal degree of segmenta-
tion is always extreme, i.e. maximal or minimal. We show next that this is no longer true
when the distribution of the shocks is more complex, as for instance when it is given by the
mixture of two Pareto distributions.
Proposition 4 Suppose that the shock L˜b is distributed as a mixture of a Pareto distribution
with parameter γ > 1 and another Pareto distribution with parameter γ′ < 1, with respective
weights p and 1−p. Then, there exist p0, p1, 0 < p0 < p1 < 1, such that, whenever p ∈ (p0, p1),
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the optimal pattern of segmentation for the completely connected structure is symmetric with
components of intermediate size K∗ + 1, 1 < K∗ < N − 1.
Abusing slightly previous notation, denote by Dc(K, γ, γ
′, p) = pEγgc(L˜b;K) + (1 −
p)Eγ′gc(L˜b;K) the expected mass of firms who default in a complete component of size
K+1 when indirectly hit by a b shock hitting a firm in the component, and the distribution
of this shock is as in the statement of the above proposition. We show in the proof of
this result that the function Dc(K, γ, γ
′, p) attains a minimum at an intermediate value
Kˆ ∈ (1, N −1). A symmetric structure with all components of size Kˆ is however generically
not feasible now (i.e. violates the condition
∑C
i=1(Ki + 1)/N = 1). We then show that the
optimal structure is still symmetric, with all components of size K∗, smaller or equal to Kˆ.
A numerical analysis of the problem shows that a similar conclusion applies to the
case where the components display a ring structure. That is, an intermediate level of
segmentation continues to being optimal when the shock distribution involves a mixture of
Pareto distributions with both fat and thin tails. However, since an analytic result in this
case is hard to obtain, we illustrate matters through the following example.
Example 1 Set γ = 2, γ′ = 0.5 and p = 0.95. For these values we find that the value
of K which minimizes Dc(K, γ, γ
′, p) is Kˆc = 5.65, and at this value the expected mass of
defaults (when a b shock hits some other firms in the component) is 0.13. The value of K
that minimizes the corresponding expression for the ring structure, Dr(K, γ, γ
′, p), is higher,
Kˆr = 8.02, and the expected mass of defaults in this case is also higher, equal to 0.145. The
fact that Kˆr > Kˆc can be intuitively understood as a reflection of the fact that, when arranged
optimally, components with a ring structure compensate for their lower density of connections
with a larger size. See Figure 3 for a graphical depiction of these two functions.
To find the optimal financial structure for the whole system we also need to specify the value
of N . Let N = 10. In this case it is clear that a symmetric structure with equal components of
size Kˆc+1 is not feasible when the components are completely connected, and the same applies
to components of size Kˆr + 1 when they are rings. We find that both for the complete and the
ring structures the optimal configuration of the system is given by two equal-sized components
of size K∗ + 1 = 5. Moreover, in line with the conclusions stated above for the values of
the mass of expected defaults at Kˆr and Kˆc, we find that the optimal complete structure still
dominates the optimal ring structure: the former yields an expected mass of defaults equal to
0.26 in contrast with 0.32 induced by the latter (see Figure 4). This conclusion is robust to
alternative specifications of the parameter values of the environment.
3.3 Sparse Connections
Let us consider now the case where the probability distribution of the b shocks is not
smooth because it has some atoms. More precisely, let Φ(Lb) be the mixture of a Pareto
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Figure 3: Expected mass of firms in a component of size K indirectly affected by a b shock
who default when this shock hits their component, as given by the function Dv(K, ·) of the
component’s size K, for both complete and ring structures (v = c, r). The parameter values
are γ = 2, γ′ = 0.5, p = 0.95.
distribution with γ > 1 and a Dirac distribution putting all probability mass on a shock of
magnitude L¯ > 2(N − 1). On the one hand, note that the Pareto distribution considered
has no fat tails. With such a distribution, as we saw in Section 3.1, minimal segmentation
(K = N − 1) is optimal and, in addition, the completely connected structure dominates
the ring structure. On the other hand, the shock L¯ selected by the Dirac distribution has
the following property. If a shock of that magnitude occurs and firms are arranged in a
single component, all firms default when they are completely connected while some survive
if arranged in a ring. Combining the previous considerations, we show below that there is
an open region of parameter values for which the second effect prevails over the first one
and hence the optimal financial structure is a ring. Under such conditions, therefore, sparse
connections are optimal.
Proposition 5 Let L˜b be distributed as a mixture of a Pareto distribution with parameter
2 > γ > 1 and a Dirac distribution with all mass concentrated on L¯ = 2(N − 1) + 1, with
weights respectively given by p and 1− p. Then, for all values of N such that
N > 1 +
(
1
4γ−1
− 1
5γ
+
1
2γ−1
1
(γ+1)
γ+1
2γ+1
− 1γ+1
) 1
2−γ
(23)
and provided that
(1− p)
p
< (γ − 1)
(
1
2(N − 1)
)γ
, (24)
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Figure 4: Expected mass of firms in a system with N firms indirectly hit by a b shock
who default when this shock hits a component in the system, as given by the function
Wv(K, ·) ≡ K+1N Dv(K, ·) + N−K−1N Dv(N −K − 2, ·), for the complete and ring structures
(v = c, r). The system consists of N = 10 firms divided into two components of size K and
N −K. The parameter values are as in Figure 3, i.e. γ = 2, γ′ = 0.5, p = 0.95.
there exists an open set of values of p such that the optimal financial structure is a single ring
component.
The role of inequality (24) is to guarantee that the weight p on the Pareto distribution
is sufficiently high that the optimal segmentation structure is determined by it and hence
a single component is optimal for the completely connected structures. But then, given
that there is also a non negligible probability that a large shock arrives that cannot be fully
absorbed, some attempt at “controlling the induced damage” may be in order. And this is
indeed what the ring achieves – a suitable compromise between the extent of risk sharing
allowed by extensive indirect connectivity (i.e. minimal segmentation) and the limits to
wide risk contagion resulting from sparse direct connections.
4 Stability and optimality
We now examine the relationship between the optimal pattern of linkages derived in the
previous section and the individual incentives to form those linkages. We explore, in other
words, whether social welfare is aligned with the maximization of individual payoffs. To
model the strategic considerations involved in the creation of networks structures, we will
model a network-formation game. Since we have only explored the payoffs accruing to
structures formed by complete components and rings, we need to restrict our analysis to
such kinds of structures. For simplicity we concentrate on completely connected component
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structures in what follows. The network-formation game is then assumed to be conducted
as follows:
• Firms independently submit their proposals concerning the components to which they
want to belong. Formally, a strategy of each firm i is a subset Si ⊂ N , with the
property that i ∈ Si.
• A particular proposal Si is accepted only when all the firms j ∈ Si make the same
proposal, i.e. Sj = Si. Formally, given a profile of strategies S ≡ (Si)i∈N a component
S is established if and only if for all the firms i ∈ S, Si = S. If the proposal Si of firm
i is rejected, that is if for some j ∈ Si, Sj 6= Si, firm i stays isolated.
Given the above network-formation rules, a specific network Γ(S) is induced by each
strategy profile S. As maintained throughout, the payoff of each firm i is decreasing in
ϕi(Γ (S)), its own default probability resulting from the network induced by S. Formally,
we can w.l.o.g. identify its payoff with −ϕi(Γ (S)), the opposite of that probability.
In such a network-formation game, an undesirable feature of the standard concept of
Nash Equilibrium is that it leads to a vast multiplicity of equilibrium networks, a conse-
quence of the fact that the formation of any link induces a coordination problem between
the two agents involved. (As an extreme illustration, note that the empty network can
always be supported by a Nash equilibrium where every agent proposes nobody to link
with.) To address this issue, it is common in the literature to consider a strengthening
of the Nash equilibrium notion that reduces miscoordination by allowing sets of agents to
deviate jointly (see e.g. Goyal and Vega Redondo (2007) or Calvo´-Armengol and Ikilic¸
(2009)). In the context of our model, we shall capture this idea by means of the concept
we label Coalition-Proof Equilibrium (CPE), where any group (i.e. coalition) of agents can
coordinate their deviations:
Definition 1 A strategy profile S ≡ (Si)i∈N of the network-formation game defines a Coalition-
Proof equilibrium (CPE) if there is no subset of firms W and a strategy profile for these firms,
(S′j)j∈W , such that
15
∀i ∈W, ϕi
[
Γ
(
(S′j)j∈W , (Sk)k∈N\W
)]
< ϕi[Γ(S)].
The CPE notion precludes joint profitable deviations by any arbitrary set of firms,
so it is obviously a refinement of the standard notion of Nash Equilibrium. A requirement
typically imposed on coalition-based notions of equilibrium is that the coalitional deviations
considered should be robust, in the sense of being themselves immune to a subcoalition
profitably deviating from it. This requirement has no bite for our analysis since we can show
15In line with what was postulated in Section 2, we shall continue to assume that, after any change in
connections has been implemented, the firms involved in the change continue to distribute the fraction 1−α
of their own assets among all their neighbors (old and new) in a uniform manner
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that all the profitable deviations that need to be allowed are robust in the aforementioned
sense.16
Consider first the case where the optimal completely connected structure consists of
identical components of the size that minimizes the mass of defaults in a component – thus,
in this case, the feasibility constraint
∑C
i=1(Ki + 1)/N = 1 does not bind (as for instance
in Proposition 2). Then it is immediate to verify that the optimal structure is also a CPE.
In contrast, we show below (Proposition 6) that this is no longer necessarily true when the
feasibility constraint binds.
To make the point, we analyze the CPE for the class of distributions considered in
Section 3.2 and show that, in that context, there is typically a conflict between social opti-
mality and individual incentives. To understand the conflict, first recall from Proposition 4
that there is an open set of the parameter space for which, under the aforementioned class
of shock distributions, the optimal completely connected structure involves a symmetric
segmentation of the whole population into several components of equal size, K∗+ 1. More-
over, K∗ + 1 is typically smaller than the individually optimal component size Kˆ + 1 that
minimizes default within a given component.
This gap produces a conflict between individual and social incentives, which is reflected
by the inefficiency of CPE configurations. In a CPE the outcome is asymmetric: individual
incentives (supported by coalitional deviations) give rise to all but one component being of
the individually optimal size Kˆ + 1 and one other component of a size smaller than K∗+ 1.
But this, to repeat, cannot be socially optimal because standard convexity considerations
favor a more balanced configuration where the sizes of all components are equal.
Proposition 6 Consider the same environment as in Proposition 4. Then, for p ∈ (p0, p1), the
socially optimal completely connected structure cannot be supported at a CPE of the network
formation game. Among the completely connected structures, the only CPE configuration is
asymmetric with all but one component displaying the size Kˆ that minimizes Dc(K, γ, γ
′, p)
and one component of a lower size.
The basis for the above result is two-fold. First, it is clear that no component prevailing
at a CPE can be larger than Kˆ + 1, the size that is individually optimal. For, if it were, an
obvious coalitional deviation would be available. Moreover, if there is any component of a
size lower than Kˆ + 1, there can be no more than one. For otherwise a profitable deviation
towards a larger component would be feasible for a suitable coalition. In this context, the
source of the conflict between social and individual optimality lies in the externality that
is imposed by the fact that the adding-up constraint must hold in the aggregate across all
components. Therefore, as firms in any component strive for the size that is individually
16See Remark 2 in the Appendix.
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(or component-wise) optimal, this will generally force other firms to remain in a component
that is too small to share risk efficiently.
As a simple illustration of the problem, refer back to Example 1, where the efficient
configuration involves two completely connected components of common size equal to K∗+
1 = 5, while the individually optimal size for each component is Kˆc + 1 = 6.65, the value
that minimizes Dc(K, 2, 0.5, 0.95). In contrast the only CPE configuration is asymmetric
with two components, one displaying a size of 6.65 and the other a smaller “residual size”
of 3.35.
The existence of a conflict between efficiency and strategic stability is of course hardly
novel nor surprising in the field of social networks (see e.g. Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) for
an early instance of it). For, typically, the creation or destruction of any link between two
agents impose externalities on others that are not internalized by the two agents involved in
the linking decision. In the context of risk-sharing, this tension has been studied in a recent
paper by Bramoulle´ and Kranton (2007) – hereafter labelled BK – and it is interesting to
understand its differences with our approach. We close, therefore, this section with a brief
comparison of the two models.
BK consider an environment consisting of a finite number of agents affected by i.i.d.
income shocks. Linkages generate risk sharing in a way similar to that of our model, except
in two important respects: (a) risk-sharing is complete (i.e. uniform) across all members in a
component; (b) there is no risk of contagion, so the size of optimal components is just limited
by the fact that links are assumed to be costly. Focusing on the notion of strategic stability
(which is weaker than ours),17 BK are also interested in comparing efficient and equilibrium
configurations. They find that whenever equilibrium structures exist (not always), there
are at most two asymmetric components, with sizes smaller than the optimal one.
The contrast between BK’s conclusions and ours derives from the nature of the exter-
nality in the two cases. In BK, given that the cost of any new link is borne only by the
two agents involved, the equilibrium induces an underinvestment in link formation (which
is a “public good”). Instead, in our case there are no linking costs, so the nature of the
externality that is not internalized is quite different. It has to do with the fact that, when
firms deviate to reach a larger component of individually optimal size, they do not inter-
nalize that the firms that are left behind will be forced to components that are inefficiently
small. Thus, in the end, it is the need to meet an overall feasibility constraint imposed by
the finite measure of the population that typically generates inefficiencies.
17Strategic stability allows only for coalitions of at most two players and rules out as well the simultaneous
creation and destruction of links. See Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) for details.
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5 Asymmetric environments
So far we have concentrated the discussion on a situation where all firms in the system
are identical. Although this allows us to obtain analytical results and gather intuition,
it is important to extend our analysis to situations where firms are significantly different
in size or in their shock distribution, as often happens in the real world. To this end,
we shall simplify the analysis and focus our attention in the next subsection on the case
where structures are completely connected. In the following subsection we also allow for
some asymmetry in network structures. Under these circumstances, there is no real gain in
using the continuum approximation of the patterns of firms’ exposure and thus we revert
to the original specification, where firms are conceived as discrete entities (which can be of
different types and sizes, as we explain below).
5.1 Shock and size asymmetry
To begin with, consider the case where all firms have equal resources R in the absence of
shocks but they differ in the distribution of the shocks that may hit their project’s returns.
More precisely, suppose that the N firms are partitioned into subsets N1, ...Nn, so that
N = ∪nl=1Nl, and for every firm j ∈ Nl the big shock follows a distribution FNl with
common expected value for all l ∈ {1, ..., n}.
For each l = 1, .., n we denote by D (K,ΦNl) the expected number of firms who default
in a (complete) component of size K + 1 when indirectly hit by a b shock hitting a firm j
belonging to subset Nl . Note that, since all firms are of equal size, each firm has the same
capacity of absorbing shocks. This is what allows us to have the function D(·) depend only
on the size of the component (as determined by K) and the distribution ΦNl of the shock
hitting the firm, and not also of the types of other firms in the component. In particular,
each firm retains a fraction α of its own project and acquires the same exposure (1−α)/K
to shocks hitting any other firm in the component18. We have so:
D (K,ΦNl) = K
[
1− ΦNl
(
K
1− α
)]
. (25)
Let K∗Nl be the minimizer in K of this function.
We are interested in identifying the optimal segmentation structure, which now re-
quires determining not only the number of firms that should lie in each component but
also the composition of each component in terms of the different types of firms included
in it. One important concern will be to understand whether firm matching within compo-
nents should be assortative or dissortative – that is, whether components should be more
or less homogeneous. In this context, therefore, a structure must specify a set of com-
ponents C ≡ {Ci}i=1,...,m and, for each component i, the corresponding type distribution
18This is a consequence of the fact that, even though the risks are different, the exchange of assets is still
one for one for every pair of firms.
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{N il }i=1,...,n, where Ci = ∪nl=1N il and each N il stands for the subset of firms in Nl that
belong to component i.
Proposition 7 Suppose that, for every l, the cardinality |Nl| of the set of firms of type l is a
multiple of K∗Nl +1. Then, the optimal (completely connected) structure has all firms belonging
to homogeneous components, where firms are all of the same type, and K∗Nl + 1 is the common
size of every component consisting of firms of any given type l.
The intuition for this result is as follows. For each l, conditional on the b shock hitting a
firm of type l, the optimal arrangement is to have a homogeneous component with K∗Nl + 1
firms all of type l, as K∗Nl is the value that minimizes the function D (K,ΦNl) given in (25).
If instead the system included some heterogeneous component with firms of type j, k, its
size could not be set to equal simultaneously the (generally different) optimal sizes for the
cases of shocks hitting type j and type k firms. Such a configuration could then not be
optimal if a segmentation in optimal homogeneous components is feasible. Of course, a key
feature required for this conclusion to hold is that, as already noticed, the expected number
of indirect defaults in a component only depends on the type l of the firm directly hit by
the shock and the size of the component. That is, the indirect effect of the shock does not
depend on the distribution of types among the firms in the component not directly hit by
the shock.
Next, we turn our attention to the case where firms are heterogeneous in size. In
light of the previous result, which establishes the optimality of extreme assortativity by
distributional types, we now concentrate on environments where all firms are of the same
type as far as the distribution of the shock hitting them is concerned. For simplicity, let us
consider a situation with just two possible sizes. On the one hand, there are firms of unit
size, identical to the ones we have been considering so far. On the other hand, there are
firms of size β > 1, such larger size having the following two implications. First, the return
on the projects of these larger firms when no shock affects them is βR, so it is scaled up by
β compared to those of the smaller firms. (Naturally, we also assume that the same factor
β applies to the value of their liabilities.) Second, the larger firms are supposed to face
a probability of being directly hit by a shock that is β times larger (that is, equal to βq)
Hence, in this case, we make an assumption that is polar to the case considered before (and
thus leads to a complementary analysis): size affects the probability of arrival of the shocks,
not their distribution. In a sense, therefore, one can view a large firm as a full merge of β
small firms of the sort we have been considering so far.
Of course, in order to maintain equal values in trade, a firm of size β must exchange
assets with a firm of size 1 in a proportion 1/β to 1. Let us denote by N1 the overall set
of firms of size 1, and by Nβ the overall set of firms of size β, while N
i
1 and N
i
β stand
for the corresponding subsets of small and big firms within a component Ci. The size of
this component is thengiven by Ki + 1 =
∣∣N i1∣∣+ β ∣∣∣N iβ∣∣∣ where, as before, |·| stands for the
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cardinality of the set in question. Then the expected number of defaults in the component
if the firm hit is small (i.e. of size 1) is:19
D (Ki, 1) =
(∣∣N i1∣∣− 1)Pr{(1− α)LKi > 1
}
+ β
∣∣N iβ∣∣Pr{β (1− α)LKi > β
}
= Ki Pr
{
(1− α)L
Ki
> 1
}
,
(26)
while if the firm hit is large (of size β) the expected number of defaults is
D (Ki, β) =
∣∣N i1∣∣Pr{ (1− α)LKi + 1− β > 1
}
+ β
(∣∣N iβ∣∣− 1)Pr{β (1− α)LKi + 1− β > β
}
= (Ki + 1− β) Pr
{
(1− α)L
Ki + 1− β > 1
}
.
For each s ∈ {1, β}, define K∗s as the minimizer in K of D (K, s). The total expected
number of defaults in a system divided into m components when a b shock hits a firm is
then:
m∑
i=1
Ki + 1
N
 ∣∣N i1∣∣
Ki + 1
D (Ki, 1) +
∣∣∣N iβ∣∣∣
Ki + 1
D (Ki, β)
 .
=
m∑
i=1
∣∣N i1∣∣
N
D (Ki, 1) +
∣∣∣N iβ∣∣∣
N
D (Ki, β)

≥
m∑
i=1
∣∣N i1∣∣
N
D (K∗1 , 1) +
∣∣∣N iβ∣∣∣
N
D
(
K∗β, β
)
= D (K∗1 , 1)
|N1|
N
+D
(
K∗β, β
) |Nβ|
N
This establishes the following result.
Proposition 8 Suppose that |N1| and |Nβ| are a multiple, respectively, of K∗1 +1 and K∗β+1.
Then the optimal (completely connected) structure is such that all firms are in components
with all firms of the same size (either small or large) and the common size of every component
consisting of small (resp. large) firms is K∗1 + 1 (K∗β + 1).
It is worth noting that the same result would hold if firm size, 1 or β, instead of scaling up
the probability were to scale the size of the b shock hitting firms – that is, if the probability
that a firm of size 1 is hit by a shock of magnitude L were the same as the probability
that a firm of size β is hit by a shock of size βL. Then, it can be easily checked that,
19To derive the expression below note that, as a result of the fact that a small firm exchanges equity at
a rate 1/β with the big firm, each small firm ends up having a share (1− α) / (Ki + 1− β) of the big firm,
while the big firm has a share (1− α)β/Ki of each small firm.
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even though the counterpart of expressions (26) and (27) would be different, they would
still retain the property of being independent of the composition between small and large
firms in the component. And, as explained before, this is the key feature that yields the
above conclusion, that the optimal configuration involves the segmentation of the population
into homogeneous components, with all firms of equal size. The intuition is similar to
the one discussed when motivating Proposition 7: allowing for heterogeneous components
would mean failing to take advantage of the generally one-to-one correspondence between
component size and type – be it associated to size or shock distribution – of the firm hit by
the shock, that assures optimality.
5.2 Asymmetry in structure
Once we allow for different sizes of firms, we may also examine new types of structures
in which large and small firms may play asymmetric roles. The key question we now
study is whether it is optimal that firms of different size have a different position in the
network, and hence a different role in the pattern of risk sharing trades. To this end, our
analysis will focus on comparing two structures: (a) one symmetric, where components are
completely connected and each component involves only firms of identical size; (b) another
one asymmetric, where components have a “star” structure, consisting of a large firm that
acts as a central hub and is directly connected to various small firms.
More precisely, we consider the case where there are only two large firms and 2β small
ones. Hence in structure (a) we have two completely connected components of the same
total size: one with the two large firms; the other with the 2β small firms. In contrast,
in structure (b) we have two identical star components, each consisting of β small firms
that are solely connected to a large firm (that is, the large firm acts as a hub and there are
β spokes of unit size). Hence in this case each component is heterogeneous and not fully
connected.
The first step is to specify the pattern of exchange in the presence of firms of different
sizes and hence to determine the induced risk exposure in each of the two cases. In structure
(a), the situation is analogous to that of the completely connected structures considered in
Subsection 2.2. The exposure pattern can then be described by a matrix AK of the form
specified in (7) for a component of size K+ 1, with K = 1 and K = 2β−1 for the complete
components consisting of large and small firms, respectively.
On the other hand, in a star structure (b) the pattern of mutual exposure obtained in
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each component after the direct exchanges of assets is:20
B˜ =

θ (1− θ)/β (1− θ)/β · · · (1− θ)/β
(1− θ) θ 0 · · · 0
...
...
...
...
...
(1− θ) 0 0 · · · θ

The entries of the matrix B˜ reflect the fact the exchange of assets among firms of different
size is no longer one for one: the large firm (indexed by j = 1) must offer only a share
(1 − θ)/β of its assets for a larger share (1 − θ) in the assets of small firms (indexed by
j = 2, 3, ..., β + 1). Maintaining the feature that trades are iterated a minimal number of
times so that each firm has a non-zero exposure to any other firm in the component, we
need here one round of securitization so that the pattern of exposure among firms after
both direct and indirect trades is A˜ = B˜2, or
A˜ =

θ2 + (1− θ)2 2θ(1− θ)/β (1− θ)/β · · · (1− θ)/β
2θ(1− θ) θ2 + (1− θ)2 /β (1− θ)2 /β · · · (1− θ)2 /β
...
...
...
...
...
2θ(1− θ) (1− θ)2 /β (1− θ)2 /β · · · θ2 + (1− θ)2 /β
 .
From the above expression for A˜ we see that, for each value of θ, the fraction of claims
held by each small firm on its own project:
α = θ2 + (1− θ)2 /β, (27)
is smaller than the analogous fraction held by the large firm:
α′ = θ2 + (1− θ)2 . (28)
Naturally, the difference α′ − α > 0 grows larger with β. This is simply a reflection of the
fact that the higher is the size asymmetry between large and small firms the lower the share
of its own project that the large firm needs to trade for any given share on the project of a
small firm. As in Subsection 2.2, the value of θ will be set so that each firm maximizes the
extent of risk sharing consistent with every firm in the system (large or small) retaining at
least a share of 1/2 on the yields of its own project. From (27) and (28), it is clear that
this happens when α = 1/2 and α′ = 1/2 + (1− θ)β−1β .
As in Section 2.1, any firm i defaults when a shock L hits the project of firm j in the same
component (possibly i = j) and the firm’s exposure to the shock, a˜ijL, exceeds the firm’s
net returns (here a˜ij denotes the ij entry of A˜). This now amounts to a different condition if
the firm under consideration is big or small, since each firm has a different “return buffer”:
if i is small, default occurs when a˜ijL > 1; instead, if it is large the condition is a˜ijL > β.
The next result compares the performance of structures (a) and (b), for different values
L of the magnitude of the b shock hitting a randomly selected firm:
20We dispense here for notational simplicity with any reference to the component size (K = β + 1).
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Proposition 9 Assume β > 2. Then, if
1
1− α′ < L ≤ 2β, (29)
expected defaults are lower in structure (a) with homogeneous components than in structure
(b) with star components, while if
2(2β − 1) < L ≤ max
{
β − 1
α′ − 1/2 ,
β2
1− α′
}
(30)
the opposite conclusion holds.
First, the superiority of the symmetric (completely connected) structure in the range
given by (29) is easy to explain. In the star structure a large firm (the hub) engages in risk
sharing trades with a set of smaller firms (the spokes). This ends up limiting the possibilities
of risk sharing when a shock hits a large firm because, in order to match the lower value
of the assets of the smaller firms, the large firm is forced to hold more of its own assets
than in the symmetric structure. As a consequence, when a shock of an intermediate size
as in (29) hits a large firm, it triggers the default of the small firms in the star structure
as well as, possibly, that of the large firm. Instead such a shock hitting the big firm would
be absorbed with no defaults in a symmetric structure, due to the enhanced risk sharing
possibilities it would enjoy when connected to a firm of the same size.
On the other hand, it is precisely this limitation to the risk sharing possibilities in a
star structure that protects the hub as well as the other spokes against the shocks hitting
a small firm. As a consequence, the star structure performs better than the symmetric
structure for shocks of larger size, as in (30). In a symmetric component, these shocks are
so large that they trigger the default of all the firms linked to a firm directly hit by the
shock. In contrast, in a star component none of these firms defaults when the shock hits
one of the spoke firms – only the small firm hit defaults. In this case, therefore, the large
firm acts a sort of buffer, preventing a sizeable fraction of the shock to spread and cause
further defaults in the component.
6 Conclusion
We have proposed a stylized model to study the problem that arises when firms need to
share resources to weather shocks that can threaten their survival, but then are exposed to
the risk coming from those same connections that help them in the time of need. Depending
on the characteristics of the shock distribution, a wide variety of different configurations can
be optimal. For example, maximal segmentation in small groups is optimal if big shocks are
likely, while very large groups are optimal when most shocks are of moderate magnitude.
There are also conditions, however, when an intermediate group size is optimal or when
groups should be large but display some internal “detachment” (i.e. sparse connectivity).
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The former consideration pertains to social optimality, i.e. to the minimization of the
default rate within the whole system. We have also explored whether such social optimum
is aligned with individual optimality. And we have seen that, in general, there is a con-
flict between strategic incentives and social welfare. This tension arises from the fact that
firms have always an incentive to form connected components of the size that minimizes the
default probability of their members, thus ignoring the negative externality this behavior
imposes on other firms. Finally, we have found that when heterogeneity among firms is
allowed but network components are taken to be fully and symmetrically connected, op-
timality is achieved under perfect assortativity. But if the network structure can display
some asymmetries (e.g. a “large central” agent may act as a hub), it is optimal to take
advantage of this possibility as a firebreak under certain conditions.
The present analysis represents a first step in studying the welfare implications of al-
ternative risk-sharing network structures, as well as their (in)consistency with individual
incentives. By restricting to suitable families of network structures, we have arrived at clear-
cut conclusions as to what kind of segmentation, sparseness, or asymmetries in connections
attain optimality. The basic insights obtained from this analysis could inform the regulation
of financial systems, which are indeed subject to some of the key mechanisms contemplated
by our theoretical framework. Should one separate commercial and investment banking?
Should the financial systems of different regions be insulated from each other, or should
overall integration be pursued? Is it advisable to allow for some large central institutions
to have a buffer role in mitigating the shocks affecting smaller ones? And, in the end, how
effectively can we trust any prescriptions along these lines to be indeed impl emented by the
economic agents themselves (i.e. to be compatible with their own individual incentives)?
These are some of the questions that will naturally and crucially arise in the design and
regulation of financial systems in the real world.
Admittedly, however, our approach is too stylized to be directly useful for policy advise.
But we hope that it helps to highlight some of the main considerations that should underlie
a systematic analysis of those policy issues. Of course, a proper discussion of the such risk-
sharing and contagion phenomena in the real world would have to account for many other
important dimensions of the problem. One of these is the wide and intricate heterogeneity
that abounds everywhere. For the sake of tractability, our analysis restricts to regular or
otherwise schematic structures that are far from what we typically observe in real-world
contexts. And, a priori, it seems likely that some of the insights and recommendations
applicable to those contexts should depend on such rich heterogeneity. Another need will
be to integrate the risk-management decisions studied here with other considerations (e.g.
inter-agent cooperation, or the exploitation of synergies) that also underlie e conomic con-
nections in the real world. All of this will demand a richer theoretical framework and a more
powerful methodology, the development of which can hopefully build in a fruitful manner
upon the present effort.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1: Rearranging terms in (21) and simplifying we get:
Dr(K, γ) =
(
K
(
1
γ + 1
)
− 2
K − 1
1
γ + 1
)(
1
K + 1
)γ
+
1
K − 1
1
(γ + 1)
(
1
2
)γ−1
, (31)
and hence
∂Dr
∂K (K, γ) = − 1(K−1)2
1
(γ+1)
(
1
2
)γ−1
+
(
K
(
−γ
γ+1
)
1
K+1 +
2
K−1
1
K+1
γ
γ+1 +
(
1
γ+1
)
+ 2
(K−1)2
1
γ+1
)(
1
K+1
)γ
.
(32)
Now note that the inequality ∂Dr(K, γ)/∂K > 0 is equivalent to:
2 (K − 1)
K + 1
γ + (K − 1)2 + 2 > (K + 1)
(
K + 1
2
)γ−1
+ γK
(K − 1)2
K + 1
,
or
(K − 1)2
(
1− γK
K + 1
)
+ 2
(
1 + γ
K − 1
K + 1
)
> (K + 1)γ
1
2γ−1
,
which can be rewritten as
(K − 1)2 + 2 + γ (K − 1) (2−K) > (K + 1)γ 1
2γ−1
. (33)
So, using the identities
(K − 1)2 + 2 + (K − 1) (2−K) = K + 1
and
(K + 1)γ
1
2γ−1
= 2
(
K + 1
2
)γ
we can equivalently write (33) as follows:
K + 1
2
−
(
K + 1
2
)γ
− 1
2
(1− γ) (K − 1) (2−K) > 0.
Denote by Ξ(K, γ) the term on the left hand side of the previous inequality, conceived as a
function of K and γ. Then, to complete the proof, we establish the following property:
∀K > 1, Ξ(K, γ) ≷ 0⇔ γ ≶ 1. (34)
To show this property, note first that Ξ(K, 1) = 0 for all K, so that ∂Dr∂K (K, γ) = 0 for γ = 1
and all K. On the other hand,
∂Ξ
∂γ
(K, γ) = −
(
K + 1
2
)γ
ln
K + 1
2
+
1
2
(K − 1) (2−K)
≤ − ln K + 1
2
+
1
2
(K − 1) (2−K) ,
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the inequality being strict for all K > 1. It is then easy to verify that the terms on the two
sides of the above inequality are equal to 0 when K = 1 and the term on the right hand side
is negative21 for all K > 1, establishing (34) and hence also ∂Dr(K, γ)/∂K ≷ 0⇔ γ ≶ 1.
We conclude, as stated in the proposition, that the minimum of Dr(K, γ) is attained at
the maximum admissible value of K (i.e. N − 1) when γ > 1, while it is attained at the
lowest value of K (i.e. K = 1)22 when γ < 1. This completes the proof of the proposition.

Proof of Lemma 2 Note first that the expression of ∂Dr(K, γ)/∂K obtained in (31)
can be conveniently rewritten as follows:
∂Dr
∂K (K, γ) = − 1(K−1)2
1
(γ+1)
(
1
2
)γ−1
+
(
−K2+K+2
K−1
1
K+1
γ
γ+1 +
1
γ+1 +
2
(K−1)2
1
γ+1
)(
1
K+1
)γ
= − 1
(K−1)2
1
(γ+1)
(
1
2
)γ−1
+ 1γ+1
K2−2K+3
(K−1)2
(
1
K+1
)γ − γK+1 (K2 −K − 2) 1K−1 ( 1K+1)γ
Differentiating then again with respect to K yields:
∂2Dr(1/2,K, γ)
∂K2
= 2
(
1
2
)γ−1
(γ + 1) (K − 1)3 −
1
γ + 1
(
1
K+1
)γ
(K − 1)3 (K + 1) ×(
K3
(−γ2 + γ)+ 2K2 (2γ2 − γ)+ 5K (−γ2 + γ)+ 4K + 2 (γ − 1)2 + 2)
=
1
2γ (γ + 1) (K − 1)3
(
4− 2
γ
(K + 1)γ+1
(
(K − 1)2K (γ − γ2)
+2γ2 (K − 1)2 + 4γ (K − 1) + 4 (K + 1)
))
Hence
∂2Dr(1/2,K, γ)
∂K2
< 0
if and only if
G(K) ≡
(
K+1
2
)γ+1
(K−1)2
8 (K (γ − γ2) + 2γ2) + γ (K−1)2 + (K+1)2
< 1 (35)
21We have in fact
d
(− ln K+1
2
+ 1
2
(K − 1) (2−K))
dK
=
K + 1− 2K2
K + 1
<
2K (1−K)
K + 1
< 0
22To complete the argument we verify the claimed continuity property of Dr(K, γ), as in (31), at K = 1 :
lim
K→1
Dr(K, γ)
=
(
1
2
)γ
1
γ + 1
− lim
K→1
1
K − 1
2
γ + 1
[(
1
K + 1
)γ
−
(
1
2
)γ]
=
(
1
2
)γ (
1
γ + 1
)
− −γ2
γ
(γ + 1) 4γ
=
(
1
2
)γ
= Dr(1, γ)
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First, we observe that G (1) = 1. Thus, to establish (35), it is enough to show that G is
decreasing for all K > 1. Letting x ≡ K − 1 for notational simplicity, dG(K)dK < 0 if, and
only if,
d
dx
((
x
2 + 1
)γ+1)(
x
2 + 1
)γ+1 < ddx
(
γx
(
x
8 (x (1− γ) + 1 + γ) + 12
)
+ x2 + 1
)(
γx
(
x
8 (x (1− γ) + 1 + γ) + 12
)
+ x2 + 1
) ,
or:
γ+1
2
(
x
2 + 1
)γ(
x
2 + 1
)γ+1 = γ + 1x+ 2 < 12γ + 14xγ + 14xγ2 + 38x2γ − 38x2γ2 + 12x
2 +
1
2xγ +
1
8x
2γ + 18x
3γ + 18x
2γ2 − 18x3γ2 + 12
The above inequality is equivalent to the following one:(
γ +
1
2
xγ +
1
2
xγ2 +
3
4
x2γ − 3
4
x2γ2 + 1
)
(x+ 2) >
(γ + 1)
(
x+ γx+
1
4
x2γ +
1
4
x3γ +
1
4
x2γ2 − 1
4
x3γ2 + 1
)
,
or
γx+ 12x
2γ + 12x
2γ2 + 34x
3γ − 34x3γ2 + x
+2γ + xγ + xγ2 + 32x
2γ − 32x2γ2 + 2
>
x+ γx+ 14x
2γ + 14x
3γ + 14x
2γ2 − 14x3γ2 + 1+
γx+ γ2x+ 14x
2γ2 + 14x
3γ2 + 14x
2γ3 − 14x3γ3 + γ
,
or
7
4
x2γ +
1
2
x3γ + γ + 1 +
1
4
x3γ3 >
1
4
x2γ3 +
3
4
x3γ2 +
3
2
x2γ2.
That is
x2γ
2
(
7
2
− γ
2
2
− 3γ
)
+
1
4
x3γ
(
2 + γ2 − 3γ)+ γ + 1 > 0.
the above inequality being always true if γ < 1, which completes the proof. 
Proof of Proposition 3: From (22) and (31) we get:
Dc(K, γ)−Dr(K, γ) (36)
=
(
1
2
)γ ( 1
K
)γ−1
−K
(
1
γ + 1
)(
1
K + 1
)γ
+
2
K − 1
1
γ + 1
((
1
K + 1
)γ
−
(
1
2
)γ)
As shown in Propositions 1 and 2, when γ < 1 and N is even, the optimal structure both
for the ring and the completely connected structures has all components of size K + 1 = 2.
As we noticed, when K = 1 the pattern of exposure is identical for the ring and the
completely connected structure, hence the value of the above expression equals zero in that
case, as can be verified.23
Consider now the case γ > 1, for which K = N − 1 (i.e. minimal segmentation) is
optimal for both structures. Evaluating (36) at this value of K we find:
23Strictly speaking, we can show that that its limit for K → 1 equals zero.
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Dc(N − 1, γ)−Dr(N − 1, γ) =
=
[(
1
N
)γ
−
(
1
2
)γ] [ 2
N − 2
1
γ + 1
− N − 1
1 + γ
]
+
(
1
2
)γ [( 1
N
)γ−1
− N − 1
1 + γ
]
Since 2 ≤ (N − 1)(N − 2) for N ≥ 3, we have that for all24 N > 1 + (1 + γ) 1γ the desired
conclusion follows:
Dc(K, γ)−Dr(K, γ) < 0.
This completes the proof. 
Proof of Proposition 4: From (22), we can write:
Dc(K, γ, γ
′, p) = pK
(
1
2K
)γ
+ (1− p)K
(
1
2K
)γ′
Hence
∂Dc
∂K
(K, γ, γ′, p) = −p (γ − 1)
(
1
2K
)γ
− (1− p) (γ′ − 1)( 1
2K
)γ′
. (37)
and ∂Dc∂K > 0 is equivalent to
(1− p) (1− γ′)( 1
2K
)γ′
> p (γ − 1)
(
1
2K
)γ
,
or, since γ > 1 and γ′ < 1,
K >
1
2
(
p (γ − 1)
(1− p) (1− γ′)
) 1
γ−γ′
.
This implies that Dc(K, γ, γ
′, p) is minimized at the point
Kˆ(p) =
1
2
(
p (γ − 1)
(1− p) (1− γ′)
) 1
γ−γ′
provided this point is admissible, i.e. Kˆ(p) ∈ [1, N − 1].
Compute next the second derivative of Dc(·):
∂2Dc
∂K2
(K, γ, γ′, p) = p (γ − 1) γ
K
(
1
2K
)γ
+ (1− p) (γ′ − 1) γ′
K
(
1
2K
)γ′
≥ p (γ − 1) γ
K
(
1
2K
)γ
+ (1− p) (γ′ − 1) γ
K
(
1
2K
)γ′
= − γ
K
∂Dc
∂K
(K, γ, γ′, p)
Thus ∂
2Dc
∂K2
(1/2,K, γ, γ′, p) > 0 for all feasible K < Kˆ(p), i.e. the function Dc (·) is convex
in this range.
24Note that (1 + γ) < (N − 1)γ−1 (N − 1) < (N)γ−1 (N − 1)
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The optimal degree of segmentation for the completely connected structure is obtained
as a solution of problem 20. Denote by (K∗i )
C
i=1 a vector of component sizes that solves
this optimization problem. We will show that there exists some appropriate range [p0, p1]
such that if p ∈ [p0, p1], the optimal component sizes are such that K∗i = K∗j = K∗ for all
i, j = 1, 2, . . . , C and some common K∗ with 2 ≤ K∗ ≤ N − 2.
Choose p0 such that Kˆ(p0) =
N
2 − 1. Such a choice is feasible and unique since by A.3
N > 4, Kˆ(·) is increasing in p, Kˆ(0) = 0, and Kˆ(p)→∞ as p→ 1. Next we show that, for
all p ≥ p0, whenever C ≥ 2,the vector (K∗i )Ci=1 solving problem 20 satisfies:
∀i, j = 1, 2, . . . , C, K∗i = K∗j ≤ Kˆ(p) (38)
Let K∗i and K
∗
j stand for any two component sizes that are part of the solution to the
optimization problem. First note that, since Kˆ(p) ≥ N/2− 1, if K∗i > Kˆ(p) then we must
have that K∗j < Kˆ(p). But such asymmetric arrangement cannot be part of a solution
to problem 20 because Dc(·, γ, γ′, p) is increasing at K∗i and decreasing at K∗j . Hence a
sufficiently small increase of Kj and a decrease of Ki, which keeps Ki + Kj unchanged, is
feasible and allows to decrease the expected mass of defaults. The only possibility, therefore,
is that K∗j ≤ Kˆ(p) and K∗j ≤ Kˆ(p).
To complete the argument and establish (38), suppose that at an optimum we have
K∗i 6= K∗j for at least two components i, j. Since, as shown in the previous paragraph,
neither K∗i nor K
∗
j can exceed Kˆ(p), both K
∗
i ,K
∗
j lie in the convex part of the function
Dc(·, γ, γ′, p). It follows, therefore, that if we replace these two (dissimilar) components
with two components of equal size 12(K
∗
i + K
∗
j ), feasibility is still satisfied and the overall
expected mass of defaults is reduced, contradicting that the two heterogenous components
of size K∗i ,K
∗
j belongs to an optimum configuration.
We have thus shown that, when p ≥ p0, if at the optimum we have C ≥ 2, the
unique optimal configuration involves a uniform segmentation in components of common
size K∗(p) ≤ Kˆ(p). It remains then to show that at the optimum we indeed have C ≥ 2.
At p = p0 the optimum exhibits two components, C = 2, since the optimal component size
Kˆ(p0) = N/2−1 is feasible. Since Kˆ(p) is increasing and continuous in p and Dc(K, γ, γ′, p)
is continuous in K, by continuity there exists some p1, with p0 < p1 < 1, such that for all
p ∈ (p0, p1) the expected mass of defaults in a structure with two components, both of size
N/2− 1, is still smaller than that in a single component of size N . That is, at the optimum
C ≥ 2.
Since N/2− 1 > 1, this completes the proof that the optimal component size K∗ + 1 is
“intermediate,” i.e. satisfies 1 < K∗ < N − 1. 
Proof of Proposition 5: For the probability distribution of the b shock stated in the
claim, the expected mass of firms not directly hit by a b shock who default in a completely
connected component of size K when a b shock hits the component is:
Dc(K, γ, p) = (1− p)K + pK
(
1
2K
)γ
. (39)
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Differentiating the above expression with respect to K yields:
∂Dc(K, γ, p)
∂K
= (1− p)− (γ − 1) p
(
1
2K
)γ
,
which is negative for all K as long as (24) is satisfied. This establishes that the optimal
degree of segmentation for the complete structure is minimal, that is obtains at K = N −1.
Next, using (31) and (18), noting that L¯ > 1H = K+1 for all K, we obtain the following
expression for the expected mass of defaults in the case of the ring structure:
Dr(K, γ, p) = (1− p)
(
K −
(
K − 2
K + 1
)
K + 1
L¯
)
+ p
[(
K
γ + 1
− 2
K − 1
1
γ + 1
)(
1
K + 1
)γ]
+ p
[
1
K − 1
1
2γ−1
1
γ + 1
]
It suffices then to show that the expected mass of defaults is smaller for the ring than for
the completely connected structure when K = N − 1: Dc(N − 1, γ, p) > Dr(N − 1, γ, p) or,
substituting the above expressions:
(1− p) (N − 1) + p (N − 1)
(
1
2(N−1)
)γ
> (1− p)
(
N − 1− N2−N−22N−1
)
+
p
(
N−1
γ+1 − 2N−2 1γ+1
) (
1
N
)γ
+ p
[
1
N−2
1
2γ−1
1
γ+1
]
,
which can be rewritten as (
1−p
p
)
N2−N−2
2N−1 >(
N−1
γ+1 − 2N−2 1γ+1
) (
1
N
)γ
+ 1N−2
1
2γ−1
1
γ+1 − (N − 1)
(
1
2(N−1)
)γ
.
Using (24) the above inequality holds for an open interval of values of p if
(γ − 1)
(
1
2(N−1)
)γ
N2−N−2
2N−1 >(
N−1
γ+1 − 2N−2 1γ+1
) (
1
N
)γ
+ 1N−2
1
2γ−1
1
γ+1 − (N − 1)
(
1
2(N−1)
)γ
or
(γ − 1)
(
1
2(N−1)
)γ
2
(
(N−1)2+N−3
2(2(N−1)+1) 1
)
+ (N − 1)
(
1
2(N−1)
)γ
−2
(
(N−1)
2
(
1
γ+1
)
− 1γ+1
(
1
N−2
)) (
1
N
)γ − ( 1N−2 12γ−1 1(γ+1)) > 0
Noticing that by A.3 and (23) we have N ≥ 5 and this in turn implies
(N − 1)2 +N − 3
4 (N − 1) + 2 ≥
N − 1
4
,
a sufficient condition for the above inequality to hold is that:
(γ − 1)
(
1
2 (N − 1)
)γ
2
(
N − 1
4
)
+
2
γ + 1
1
N − 2
(
1
N
)γ
+ (N − 1)
(
1
2 (N − 1)
)γ
−
(
N − 1
γ + 1
)(
1
N − 1
)γ
−
(
1
N − 2
1
2γ−1
1
(γ + 1)
)
=
N − 2
(N − 1)γ−1
(
(γ − 1) 1
2γ+1
+
1
2γ
− 1
γ + 1
)
+
2
γ + 1
(
1
N
)γ
−
(
1
2γ−1
1
(γ + 1)
)
> 0.
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Since γ ∈ (1, 2), this inequality is in turn satisfied if the following hold:[
N − 2
(N − 1)γ−1 +
(
1
N
)γ](γ + 1
2γ+1
− 1
γ + 1
)
−
(
1
2γ−1
1
(γ + 1)
)
> 0
or
(N − 1)2−γ −
(
1
(N − 1)γ−1 −
1
Nγ
)
>
1
2γ−1
1
(γ+1)
γ+1
2γ+1
− 1γ+1
which is implied by the inequality
(N − 1)2−γ −
(
1
4γ−1
− 1
5γ
)
>
1
2γ−1
1
(γ+1)
γ+1
2γ+1
− 1γ+1
that is in turn equivalent to (23). This completes the proof of the proposition. 
Proof of Proposition 6: Let S ≡ (Si)i∈N be a CPE of the network-formation game
with completely connected components. Denote by CS the number and by {Kj + 1}C
S
j=1
the sizes of the different components of the CPE network Γ(S). Recall that Kˆ denotes the
unique value that minimizes Dc(K, γ, γ
′, p) (c.f. the proof of Proposition 4).
The proof has two main steps. We show first that for each component j = 1, .., CS
we have Kj ≤ Kˆ. That is, all components in the CPE have size smaller or equal than
the individually optimal one. Suppose not: Kj > Kˆ for some j. Choose then a subset
D of the firms belonging to component j whose measure satisfies Kj − Kˆ ≥ |D| > 0.
Since the function Dc(K, γ, γ
′, p) is increasing in K for K > Kˆ, Dc(Kq − |D|, γ, γ′, p) <
Dc(Kq, γ, γ
′, p). This implies that all the firms who are in component j except those in D
could enjoy a lower default probability by proposing a component with all the firms in j
except those with the firms in D. This establishes the desired conclusion.
Next, we show that at a CPE we have K
h˜
< Kˆ for some h˜ ∈ {1, 2, ..., CS} and Kj = Kˆ
for all j 6= h˜. We proceed again by contradiction. Suppose that there are two components
of Γ(S), j and q, such that 0 < Kj < Kq < Kˆ. Pick then a subset of firms belonging to
the first component: Dj ⊂ Kj , of measure |Dj | ≤ Kˆ − Kq. Consider the following joint
deviation for the firms in Dj as well as for all those in component q from their strategies in
S. Each of the firms in Dj together with the firms in component q propose a component
consisting of all of them (and only them). Then, we have:
Dc(Kq + |Dj |, γ, γ′, p) < Dc(Kq, γ, γ′, p) < Dc(Kj , γ, γ′, p)
Hence all firms involved benefit from the deviation, which contradicts the fact that at a
CPE we have 0 < Kj < Kq < Kˆ. This contradiction establishes the above claim and
completes so the proof of the Proposition. 
Remark 2 Note that the deviations contemplated in the proof of Proposition 6 are “internally
consistent” in the following sense. Given that any set of firms of the required composition is set
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to deviate, this deviation is itself in the interest of any subset of this set that might reconsider
the situation. This requirement (which is commonly demanded in the game-theoretic literature
for coalition-based notions of equilibrium), is clearly satisfied in our case since, by refusing to
follow suit with the deviation, any firm in this subset can only lose, because of the monotonicity
of the function Dc (.).
Proof of Proposition 7: If a component i is hit a by a b shock, the expected number
of defaults among firms not directly hit by it is:
n∑
l=1
∣∣N il ∣∣
Ki + 1
D (Ki,ΦNl) ,
where Ki + 1 is as usual the size of component i, in this case given by
∑n
l=1
∣∣N il ∣∣ . Then the
total expected number of defaults in the system when a b shock hits a firm is
I∑
i=1
Ki + 1
N
n∑
l=1
∣∣N il ∣∣
Ki + 1
D (Ki,ΦNl) .
=
I∑
i=1
n∑
l=1
∣∣N il ∣∣
N
D (Ki,ΦNl) .
Exchanging the summation indices, we get
n∑
l=1
I∑
i=1
∣∣N il ∣∣
N
D (Ki,ΦNl) ≥
n∑
l=1
I∑
i=1
∣∣N il ∣∣
N
D
(
K∗Nl ,ΦNl
)
=
n∑
l=1
D
(
K∗Nl ,ΦNl
) I∑
Gi=1
∣∣N il ∣∣
N
=
n∑
l=1
|Nl|
N
D
(
K∗Nl ,ΦNl
)
.
Since |Nl| is a multiple of K∗Nl + 1 the lower bound
n∑
l=1
|Nl|
N
D
(
K∗Nl ,ΦNl
)
is also the expected number of defaults if every firm is part of a group of optimal size K∗Nl+1
with all firms of the same type. 
Proof of Proposition 8: See the main text. 
Proof of Proposition 9: To prove the result, we compute the expected number of
bankruptcies associated to the two structures (star and symmetric) for all possible levels of
the b shock.
Noting that α′−α = (1− θ)2 (β − 1) /β, the exposure matrix for the star structures can
be conveniently rewritten as follows:
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A˜ =

α′ (1− α′) /β (1− α′) /β · · · (1− α′) /β
1− α′ α (α′ − α) / (β − 1) · · · (α′ − α) / (β − 1)
...
...
...
...
...
1− α′ (α′ − α) / (β − 1) (α′ − α) / (β − 1) · · · α
 ,
Recall that α = 1/2 while α′ is determined, together with θ, by (27) and (28). Its properties
are characterized below:
Lemma 3 For all β > 2, the solution of (27) and (28) is unique and given by continuous,
monotonically increasing functions θ(β) and α′(β), such that
5/9 ≤ α′(β) < 2− 2
√
2 (40)
Proof of Lemma 3:
It can be easily verified that for all β > 2 there is only one admissible (i.e., lying between
0 and 1) solution of (27), given by
2 +
√
2β2 − 2β
2β + 2
.
This expression defines the function θ(β), which is increasing if and only if the following
inequality is satisfied:
(4β − 2)
2
√
2β2 − 2β (2β + 2) >
(
4 + 2
√
2β2 − 2β
)
,
which is equivalent to
2β2 + β − 1 > 2
√
2β2 − 2β + 2β2 − 2β
or
9β2 − 6β + 1 > 8β2 − 8β
always satisfied for β > 2. The minimal value of θ in this range is then θ(2) = 2/3, while
the maximum is limβ→∞ θ(β) = 1/ 2
√
2.
Also, α′(β) is also increasing in β
dα′
dβ
= 2(2θ − 1) dθ
dβ
.
Hence its minimum value is α′(β) = 5/9 and its maximum is 2− 2√2. 
Denote by Gstar(L) and Gsym(L) the functions that specify the total size of all
25 the
firms who default, resp. for the star and the symmetric structure, as a function of the
magnitude L of the b shock.
25Note that, in contrast to the functions gν(L;K,M), ν = c, r, introduced in Section 2.2, the functions
Gstar(·), Gsym(·) describe the number of all firms who default, that is including the firm that is directly
hit by the shock L. Since the degree of risk externalization, as we noticed, may now differ across different
structures, so does the probability that a firm directly hit by a shock defaults.
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Let us begin by determining the total size of firms defaulting if the shock hits a small
firm and the structure of the component to which it belongs is a star. For any given value
of L, it is given by the following function26:
Gsstar(L) =

0 for L ≤ 1α = 2
1 for 2 < L ≤ min
{
β−1
α′−1/2 ,
β2
1−α′
}
β if β−1α′−1/2 ≤ β
2
1−α′
1 + β otherwise
for min
{
β−1
α′−1/2 ,
β2
1−α′
}
< L ≤ max
{
β−1
α′−1/2 ,
β2
1−α′
}
2β for L > max
{
β−1
α′−1/2 ,
β2
1−α′
}
Instead, if the structure is still a star but the shock hits a large firm (i.e. the hub), the
expected number of defaults is given by the following function:
G`star(L) =

0 for L ≤ 11−α′
β for 11−α′ < L ≤ βα′
2β for L > 11−α′
,
since the upper and lower bounds on α′ established in the previous Lemma imply that
β/α′ > 1/(1−α′). Ex ante, a shock hitting a component of the network has the same prob-
ability of striking a large firm or a small firm. Hence, Gstar(L) =
(
Gsstar(L) +G
`
star(L)
)
/2,
or:
Gstar(L) =

0 for L ≤ 2
1
2 for 2 < L ≤ 11−α′
1
2 +
1
2β for
1
1−α′ < L ≤ βα′
1
2 +
1
22β for
β
α′ < L ≤ min
{
β−1
α′−1/2 ,
β2
1−α′
}
β
2 + β if
β−1
α′−1/2 ≤ β
2
1−α′
1+β
2 + β otherwise
for min
{
β−1
α′−1/2 ,
β2
1−α′
}
< L ≤ max
{
β−1
α′−1/2 ,
β2
1−α′
}
2β for L > max
{
β−1
α′−1/2 ,
β2
1−α′
}
,
(41)
since again it can be verified, given the previous lemma, that
2 <
1
1− α′ <
β
α′
< min
{
β − 1
α′ − 1/2 ,
β2
1− α′
}
.
Consider next the case where the structure is symmetric, with two completely connected
components, the first one with the two large firms, the second one with the 2β small firms. In
this case, since there is no asymmetry within each component, every firm retains a fraction
exactly equal to α = 1/2 of claims to the returns of its own project. The off diagonal terms
of the exposure matrix are then equal to 1/2 for the component with the two large firms
26Recall that a small firm i defaults when a shock hits a firm j if and only if a˜ijL > 1, while a large firm
k defaults if and only if a˜kjL > β.
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and 1/[2(2β − 1)] for the second one, with 2β firms. Since the shock reaches with equal
probability each of the two components, the expected number of defaults is given by the
following function:
Gsym(L) =

0 for L ≤ 2
1
2 for 2 < L ≤ 2β
1
2 +
1
22β for 2β < L ≤ 2(2β − 1)
2β for L > 2(2β − 1)
(42)
since it can be easily verified that 2 < 2β < 2(2β − 1).
A straightforward comparison of the functions Gstar(L) and Gsym(L) given in (41) and
(42), noting that βα′ < 2β and
β
α′ < 2(2β − 1) < min
{
β−1
α′−1/2 ,
β2
1−α′
}
, yields then the claim
in the proposition. 
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